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This study examines the historical trajectory and significance of the ideational 
changes from "masses" to "audience" in China's media reforms. The concept of 
"masses" articulates Maoist doctrine while the concept of "audience" is basically 
rooted in the market economy with liberal democracy. Each of the two concepts is 
a "keyword" in a particular media ideology and associates with certain institutional 
arrangements and media practices. Taking the change from masses to audience as a 
case, this study focuses on one central issue in sociology of knowledge: the 
articulation of ideas and social practices. More specifically, this study address three 
questions: 1) How is the idea of audience, as a reform discourse, introduced, 
localized and transformed in the changing historical conditions of China's reforms? 
2) How does the introduction of this new idea crack open some institutional space 
for new practices, new relationships and even a new industry of audience surveys? 3) 
How do such practices help legitimize the notion of audience and render it currency 
in media's routine operations? The author argues, ideational change is a sequential 
process. Triggered by the legitimacy crisis of the existing ideological system, it 
first occurs in the discursive sphere. Such ideational change inspires and prescribes 
new practices, which are in turn subject to the processes of appropriation, 
incorporation and institutionalization in completing its course. Given the right 
social conditions, the old yet better established ideology may sustain itself by co-
opting the new ideas and practices. 
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踐經歷“適宜（appropriation) ”、 “倂合（incorporation) ”，乃至最終“制 
度化（institutionalization) ”的過程。在一定社會條件下，舊的意識型態或能 
成功吸納新的觀念和實踐，緩解其合法性危機，從而得以持續運作。 
























INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF IDEATIONAL CHANGE 
In October 1998，a new book filled with statistics and tables hit the bookshelves of 
Beijing bookstores. Edited by a team led by a deputy director of the China Central 
Television (CCTV)，the book reports the results of the 1997 nationwide TV audience 
survey conducted in China. The publication of such audience survey results would 
have been too mundane of an event to require much scholarly attention had it not 
suggested the basic tension in China's media reforms, the tension of the media having 
"to serve two masters," the Party and the audience (Polumbaum, 1990). As Yang 
Weiguang, the Director of CCTV, states in his brief preface to the new book, as a 
Party's mouthpiece and the state organ, CCTV still needs to concern about program 
ratings and audience surveys because it must "meet the needs of audiences of different 
levels," "serve the masses," and at the same time, “attract more advertisement" (Yang, 
1998, p.i). 
Yang's preface is a typical example of the official discourse of media operation in 
reform China in the 1990s. In such discourse, the vocabulary of the Party-press 
system and that of the market-based media system intermingle with seeming 
casualness. A case in point is that Yang uses “masses” and "audience" as 
interchangeable concepts, although in China's unique social and historical context, 
they have been representing two different discursive fields. “Masses {qunzhongy is a 
highly politicized concept that anchors the Maoist Party-press ideology. It prescribes 
the domination and leadership by the Party both through and within the media. It 
defines the media as among the state bureaucratic and coercive apparatuses for the 
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Party to achieve its total domination over the masses. In contrast, "audience" is an 
alien concept that gains currency in the reform discourse precisely because it in effect 
de-politicizes the media-masses relationship and opens up a new discursive field in 
which issues such as service, information, professionalism, and even diversity may 
and do arise during the reform era. The historical trajectory of the rise and fall in the 
currency of these two concepts, therefore, offers traces of the ideational changes in 
China's reform and the related changes in media institutional arrangement and 
practices. What are the historical imperatives for the change from "masses" to 
"audience" in anchoring the reform discourse on Chinese media? How has the 
introduction of "audience" since the beginning of China's "reform and opening" been 
related to the changing conceptions of media and the changing media practices in 
Chinese society? This study addresses these questions. 
The Articulation of Ideas and Practices 
This is a case study that examines ideational changes in China's reform era when the 
official and professional discourses moved gradually to supplement "masses" with 
"audience" in discussing the roles and functions of the media. It aims at achieving two 
objectives. One is to demonstrate the changing media ideologies and practices in 
reform China. The other is, based on the empirical evidence from the Chinese context, 
to develop a broad theoretical argument on what constitute an ideational change and 
how such a change is related to changing institutional arrangement and social 
practices. 
The starting point of my arguments is that each of the two concepts is located in the 
constellation of ideas that is recognized as a media ideology. Here, media ideology 
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refers to a system of ideas and principles on media's role and functions, modes of 
media operation, and media's position in the related political economic system. Most 
of the ideas in the media ideology are presumed, taken for granted, and embodied in 
the everyday routines of media professionals' work and people's interactions with 
media (Gitlin, 1980; Hall, 1982). Thus, changing from masses to audience typifies 
ideological contestations in China's media reforms. It condenses certain changes that 
are more fundamental than what the immediate causes and effects of certain reform 
practices would entail. 
So far, scholars who write on China's media reforms have all attempted to interpret 
and explain the apparent tensions and ambiguities involving the Party's political 
control and economic liberalism (Lee, 1994). Some take a political economic 
perspective on the roots and implications of such tensions (Chan, 1993; 1995). Others 
seek an institutionalist interpretation of how such tensions become imperatives for a 
unique incremental mode of changes in China's media institution (Chen, 1999; Pan, 
1997a). Although some have touched on media professionals' strategic and 
innovative uses of the reform discourse (e.g., Pan, 1997b), it remains unclear how 
some of the major ideational changes during the reform era have been coupled with 
reform activities. As a result, the ideational and practice praxes remain disconnected. 
It is this author's contention that coupling these two praxes would offer us a fresh look 
at China's media reforms and could yield new insights into the dynamics as well as the 
future development of the reforms. 
This study follows a different tradition, that of sociology of knowledge, to examine the 
production, selection, and institutionalization of an ideology. Exemplars in this long-
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standing tradition include the works by scholars such as Edward Said (1978)， 
Raymond Williams (1976)，Michel Foucault (1973)，and Robert Wuthnow (1989). 
Following this tradition, the research questions raised in this study can be framed in 
theoretical terms as follows: How are the meaning systems associated with certain 
ideas “developed, transmitted, and maintained in social settings" (Berger and 
Luckman, 1967，p. 3) and how do they congeal into institutionalized social practices? 
These are two different aspects of the “enigmatic，，relationship between ideational 
production and the social conditions of such production (Wuthnow, 1989, p. 3). 
This study shares with before-mentioned seminal studies the premise that ideational 
production is not historically accidental, nor socially and politically transcendental. 
Rather, it is situated in a historically specific social and political context and at the 
same time renders significance to such a context. As Wuthnow (1989) points out, 
“social conditions and particular ideologies" "articulate with one another." Based on 
this theoretical premise, this study argues that the substance the "masses" concept lies 
in its particular relationships with other concepts about the relationships between the 
Party and media, between the Party and the masses and between classes in the official 
discourse. These relationships are objectified in the media practices and institutional 
arrangement that constitute the "commandist" Party-press system (Lee, 1990). 
Similarly, the concept of "audience" entered the Chinese discourse on media through 
its coupling with the social practices that arose from the introduction of market 
mechanisms to media operation. These social practices are eroding the commandist 
relationship between the Party and the media operations. In this transformation 
process, however, the concept of "masses" is never abandoned or repudiated. Rather, 
increasingly, it has to share the stage with the imported concept "audience." The two 
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terms each functions as an anchor for a constellation of ideas that in some significant 
degree articulates with a particular media system arrangement and its constituting 
practices. 
Articulation so conceived concerns the historically and sociologically dynamic 
involving ideas and practices as two praxes. It is a central problem in sociology of 
knowledge (Wuthnow, 1989; Berger and Luckman, 1967). As used in this study, the 
concept involves three aspects. First, articulation occurs at a historical juncture when 
imported ideas meet the dominant ideological system. It captures a mutual adaptive 
relationship between an imported idea and the existing ideology. While the former 
can only thrive by being incorporated into the latter, the latter sustains its legitimacy 
with the incorporation of the former. In China's reforms, the Party-press ideology, so 
much to the heart of maintaining the Party's political control, remains to be heavily 
guarded and fortified. In the wave of media commercialization, such fortification also 
takes the form of appropriating and incorporating the ideas of the market economy 
into Maoist doctrine. Any ideational innovation can only occur, at least at the 
beginning, within the old ideological framework. The new idea has to draw resources 
from and makes itself compatible with the existing meaning system. However, once 
an alien idea squeezes into the old ideological system without being castigated as 
"oppositional" or "detrimental" to the system, its meaning can be further augmented. 
A new idea with its ability for augmented meanings will then function as an alternative 
framework for practitioners to look at as well as to think and talk about the reality of 
the media reforms. 
The second aspect of articulation is more directly on the linkage between an imported 
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idea and newly emerged practices. Such practices, often inspired and prescribed by 
the new idea, are non-routine and novel at the beginning, and their legitimacy is in 
doubt. The new idea, when coupled with the discursive means from the existing 
ideology, provide the rationale and justifications for the new practices by showing the 
benefits of implementing them. As a result, they may open the institutional space for 
the new practices to break through the existing structural constraints. Following this 
logic, we can see that the idea of audience acquires significance for expanding the 
basis of legitimacy for the practices of media operation within the orbit of the Party-
state. However, this is only one side of the story. The other side of the story is that the 
emerging practices also help substantiate and stabilize a new idea. Moreover, the 
development of such practices also becomes a source of discursive energy to enrich 
and reshape, and further legitimize the meaning of the new idea. 
Third, the articulation also involves the dynamics between an imported idea and the 
changing configuration of power in the society. In other words, any idea needs the 
backing of power, consisting of the proponents strategically located in the existing 
power structure. These are social actors with access to resources for disseminating the 
new ideas and elaborating them in the vocabulary recognized in the existing 
ideological system. Some of these actors are also in the position to provide the 
"political safety net" for those who implement the novel practices. The adoption of 
these new ideas is contingent upon the changing power configuration tilted in favor of 
the proponents of such ideas. In bringing the “audience，，concept to China's media 
reforms, different actors are involved. They cut across the role specifications such as 
Party propaganda chiefs, media regulators, media managers, journalists, media 
scholars, and so on and are divided by different ideologies to form identifiable 
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discursive "clusters." Each cluster becomes a carrier of one particular ideology. They 
engage in sometimes-heated debates over the meaning of any newly arising concept 
and the significance of the existing one. That is why the media reforms stumble 
forward with one heated debate after another, every one of which is simultaneously 
professional, intellectual, and ideological. In this process, the actors who have 
contacts with alternative sources of information are in a better position to be in the 
position to spot new ideas. However, it takes the actors with recognized authority, 
expertise, or relevance, which together determine the legitimacy of the actors within 
the established institution, to appropriate the imported idea strategically so that it 
could edge into the carefully patrolled reform discourse. Actual practices of media 
professionals who are under the pressure of survival in market situations function as 
the best resources for the intellectual current that bears the new idea. Through the 
artifacts and practices, i.e., discourse, of these participants, we can examine the 
dynamic interface of competing ideologies (Wuthnow, 1989，p. 16). 
The dynamics discussed above constitute the three aspects of articulation between 
ideas and practices. The three aspects in my framework for analyzing the ideational 
change from masses to audience unfold in a set of processes with a temporal sequence. 
Such temporal development is along two intersected lines of investigation, the 
ideational praxes and the practice praxes. In the ideational praxes, the concept of 
"audience" goes through the sub-processes of localization, accommodating an alien 
idea to the local frame of meanings and to satisfy the local needs, and transformation, 
specifying, enriching, and augmenting the meaning of the new concept in different 
historical conditions. In the practice praxes, the concept generates three sub-processes, 
appropriation, incorporation and institutionalization. Appropriation occurs when the 
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introduction of a new idea inspires new practices. It involves discursively legitimizing 
new practices inspired by the imported idea within the dominant ideology. In addition, 
it confines the new practices to serve the needs that are still framed in the existing 
system and have traditionally been served by the routine practices of the system. 
Incorporation refers to the process of system adaptation. In this process, each of the 
arenas of the existing system contributes its resources to developing the new practices 
into part of its constituting components. Institutionalization takes place when the new 
practices are routinzed as a not only accepted but also normal and expected means of 
regulating the relationships among different actors/agencies of a system. 
The temporal movement along the two praxes is closely related. It is ignited when the 
existing ideology can no longer provide a coherent account of the changing reality, as 
it was the case after the fall of the Gang of Four. That was the time when the 
ideological legitimacy of the Communist Party was in crisis, so was the Maoist 
doctrine of the Party press. Such crisis led to the search for remedies, resulting in the 
introduction of a series of new ideas. The concept of "audience" was among them. 
What made this idea so significant is a set of new practices that it brought along, thus, 
setting in motion of the ideation-practice dynamics examined in this study. After the 
development of nearly 20 years, at the height of marketization, the practices 
associated with this concept have become not only part of the routines in media 
operations, but also the normal ways in handling the relationships between media and 
other institutions. The practices in such institutional settings finally congeal the idea 
of audience into an institutional arrangement, realizing a full articulation between the 




Together, the three aspects of articulation and the temporal processes provide a 
"theoretical scaffold" for me to organize the evidence on the ideational change from 
"masses" to "audience." Following the logical sequence of ideational change, in 
Chapter 2, I will contrast "audience" in the communication literature based on the 
western experiences and "masses" in the Maoist doctrine. Through this analysis, I 
wish to show that the Maoist media ideology with the masses as a keyword is 
congealed into a Party "commandist system" (Lee, 1990), revealing the general 
principle in sociology of knowledge on the articulation of ideation and social reality. 
With the concept of audience extracted from the literature as reference, we can see that 
the media reforms which aims at reconfiguring certain institutional arrangement in 
this system (Pan, 1997a) is inevitably predicated upon and further compels the 
changes of the ideational system centered on "masses." 
In Chapter 3, I will discuss in details the complex historical dynamics in which the 
idea of audience was introduced into China in concrete political and economic 
contexts. The process of introducing this concept involves adapting the imported alien 
concept and its associated practices to the local contexts to satisfy local needs. In this 
localization process, different dimensions of the construct of audience are recognized 
and take shape at different historical moments, further illustrating the historiticity of 
ideational changes. Together, the concepts of localization and transformation serve to 
capture essential dynamics of ideational change. 
The newly introduced ideas can only be stabilized when they are translated into 
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concrete social practices. Therefore, Chapter 4 turns the attention to the processes in 
which the ideas associated with the concept of "audience" are translated into concrete 
and recurrent social practices. By analyzing the intricacies of power plays in the 
development of audience surveys, market surveys, program ratings and opinion polls, 
I show how the power relationships in China's media industry and the related 
institutions/industries are reconfigured and how a new institutional arrangement 
emerges. 
Finally, I will conclude my analysis by linking the ideational changes in China's 
media reforms to the general concerns in sociology of knowledge. I argue that 
ideational changes are historically grounded and sociologically rooted. Analyzing 
such changes entails taking a frontal and dynamic view of the linkages between the 
super- and base-structxire, a Marxist dichotomy often presumed rather than analyzed. 
With this analysis, we can see not only the changing practices and institutions, but also 
the emancipatory and inhibitory roles of the prevailing ideas in a society. 
Methodology 
In this study, I have adopted historical discourse analysis as the basic methodological 
approach. In essence, this approach involves systematically examining the historical 
archives and trade publications related to China's media reforms and analyzing them 
as a form of discourse among different players in the reforms. In addition, my analysis 
also involves linking such discourse analysis to the ideational dimension of various 
related practices, in particular, the practices of surveys inspired by the concept of 
audience and compelled by deepening marketization. To achieve this, I conducted 12 
in-depth interviews with the participants or witnesses of the changes during the period 
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(1979-1999) examined. Detailed information of the empirical materials analyzed is 
provided in the Appendix. 
First, to investigate Maoist discourse on media ideology and its corresponding 
institutions and practices that were anchored in the concept of masses, I conducted a 
systematic reading of three types of historical archives: 1) the published speeches of 
the top Party leaders and the officials in the top echelon of the Party in charge of 
ideological work; 2) the published speeches and articles by current media regulators 
and media officials; 3) media scholars' publications that articulate and elaborate the 
official policies and statements. The selection of the archival materials is based on 
their political authorities, representatives of the ideas and degree of influence in the 
discourse community. The names and detailed positions of the authors are listed in the 
Appendix. 
Second, to trace the historical trajectory of the introduction of "audience," I conducted 
in-depth interviews with 12 media scholars and educators who are still active in the 
field of communication and journalism studies either in the Mainland China or in the 
periphery of the Cultural China, for example, in Hong Kong. All these interviewees 
were participants of the intellectual ferment of introducing the concept of audience 
and associated with it, the academic field of communication research in the early 
days.i Names and identities of the interviewees and specific dates of the interviews 
are listed in the Appendix. 
1 However, several players at that time are not accessible to me now because of either their advanced 
age (e.g., professor Zhang Longdong of People's University) or their migration to theWest (e.g., 
Professors Zheng Beiwei and Chen Yunzhao of Fudan University). The remaining ones are not 
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Third, to explore the development of the survey practices in China which provides an 
industry base for the ideational change from "masses" to "audience," I also combed 
through the past issues of the trade publications in media, advertising and marketing 
research. Internally circulated publications that are available at the University Service 
Center of the Chinese University of Hong Kong are also included. In addition, I 
interviewed with Zhu Jianhua, an earlier participant in conducting audience survey 
research in China, and Victor Yuan, the executive of Horizen, the best-known private 
marketing research company which was formed in 1992. 
accessible at that time due to resource constraints that prevented me from travelling to the primary sites. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AUDIENCE AND MASSES: ARTICULATING 
WITH DIFFERENT MEDIA INSTITUTIONS AND PACTICES 
Placed in contrast, "audience" and “masses，，clearly reveal two different webs of 
meanings. They are rooted in and coupled with different social conditions. They can 
be differentiated by the type of institutional arrangement and social practices they are 
associated with. 
To understand how "masses" as a construct is webbed in the Maoist doctrine and how 
the communist commandist media system differs in principle from that in the west 
liberal democracies, I will first discuss the concept of audience found in the literature. 
Based on my reading, the construct of audience has three distinguishable dimensions, 
all rooted in the overall discursive framework in which the liberal democratic theories 
and their critical assessment are espoused. Each of these dimensions articulates a 
distinct aspect of social practices in societies with the market economy and democratic 
institutions. The concept of masses in Maoist doctrine, in contrast, has none of these 
ideational components. It is part of the Maoist ideology turned into an 
epistemological framework. Through masses, a particular way is developed to view 
the media, their roles and functions, and audiences. The ideas associated with this 
concept are developed into some concrete institutionalized practices. 
Although this chapter contrasts the two ideational systems, the emphasis is on the 
historical contexts of developing the concept of masses and the related institutional 
practices in Maoist China. With this empirical focus, I wish to show that the 
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transformation from the idea of masses to that of audience have considerable 
ideological implications, thus setting the stage for the analysis in the subsequent 
chapters. 
The Social Construction of Audience 
Audience, as a category in modem mass communication, is basically a market-based 
concept. It is embedded in the constellation of modem ideas on information 
dissemination and consumption, and articulates with concepts such as information, 
modernity, advertising, efficiency, market and so on. It is also a concept rooted in 
capitalist ideology, based on the ideas of individualism. It is located in the industrial 
capitalist system and anchors the kind of market-based social relations. 
The concept of audience occupies the central place in various conceptions of mass 
media communication, both in the scholarly and the professional spheres (McQuail, 
1994, pp. 4-6). From the existing writings on mass media, the bulk of which was 
based on western political institutions, social context and media experiences, some 
scholars have discerned several notions of audience. The most basic approach is to 
conceptualize "audience" as "information receiver," the reception end of the flow of 
media messages (Shannon & Weaver，1949; Schramm, 1954). As an abstracted 
totality including different modes of receiving behavior, audience could also be 
defined as the assemblage of newspaper readers, TV viewers or radio listeners, three 
varieties of information receivers of the mass media. In this notion, the defining 
feature of audience is to receive ---no matter whether they receive dominantly, 
selectively, negotiatingly or oppositionally --- the media content. Accordingly, the 
theoretical function of mass media is to collect and disseminate the information for the 
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audience. This conception of audience is associated itself with a cluster of 
interconnected concepts such as information sources, information channel, 
information flow, media effect, signal, feedback and individual differences. 
However, this basic conceptualization is too idealized to capture the substance and 
significance of audience as embedded in complicated societal systems. Nor could it 
contextualize the audience and clarify how the political-economic mechanism works 
on them. Many scholars have attempted to examine audience along other theoretical 
dimensions. What they seek to understand is the social meanings and economic 
values of audience in a modem society (e.g. Allor, 1988; Altheide & Snow，1991; 
Billings, 1986; Biocca, 1988; Ettema & Whitney, 1994; Livingston & Lunt，1994; 
Moores, 1993; Renckstorf, McQuail & Jankowski, 1996; McQuail, 1997; Rosengren, 
Wenner, & Palmgreen，1990; Turow, 1997). Here, I try to characterize the multiple 
identities of audience as economic audience, political audience and cultural audience. 
Economic Concept of Audience 
By the idea of economic audience, I refer to the consumers of media products with 
differentiated tastes and social needs in a media marketplace. Information is packaged 
as media products with different commercial values. They are produced and 
distributed by the media industry and bought and consumed by the audiences. 
Different from the "information receiver" notion of audience, this conception 
emphasizes the individual's selective consumption, active participation, and 
guaranteed freedom of feedback in the process of media production. These 
characteristics, if translated into political significance, do constitute the possibility of 
membership of a democratic society. In other words, the consumer notion of audience 
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has the potential to lead to political concepts such as public, citizen, democracy and 
other ideas. In this case, the economic audience is transformed into its political 
equivalent, say, political audience, which I would elaborate in more details later. 
To further explore the economic notion of audience, we should examine audience at 
the institutional level. Here, audience is not simply an assemblage of individuals, but 
as an institutionalized role relationship in the market-based media system that 
involves three parties, advertisers, media producers, and consumers of media products. 
The three parties form an interactive role relationship, created or constructed by the 
system of the capitalist cultural production with media as a key venue. In this 
complicated triangular relationship, audience's consumer consciousness is created, 
sensitized and continuously sponsored by the advertisers and the media (Smythe, 
1981). And in turn, it is the audiences who cooperate with the advertisers to create the 
potential attention to or "real" demand for advertised goods, which is the purpose of 
the capitalist advertisers. It is also the audience's economic value that is scientifically 
gauged by ratings, circulation surveys and other measurement technologies, and 
accordingly is sold by media and purchased by advertisers and marketers. 
From Marxist labor theory of value, the audience's economic value is embedded in 
their leisure time (as off-the-job work time), which is predominantly devoted to the 
media and the advertisers in the process of producing and reproducing labor power. 
The social practices of audience's use of media is not only a form of consumption, but 
more significantly, they create productive value, and generate additional value for 
capital. Audience sells their watching time as productive labor to media owners. 
They function as an abstract representation of the productive labor that allows for the 
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making of consonance with capital formation (Allor, 1988). In this sense, audience is 
"commodity" itself or in other term, "coin of exchange" within a capital logic 
(Webster & Phalen，1994). 
Political Concept of Audience 
It is needless to say that the economic conceptions of audience do not exhaust all the 
notions and variations in different discourses on media. Functionally, audience as a 
concept has its own political significance. By political audience, two different 
theoretical perspectives could be found in the communication literature. First, as a 
logical extension of the idea of economic audience, as I have mentioned above, 
audience has been viewed as rational political beings and at least potential citizens 
participating in public deliberations in the "public sphere" (e.g. Livingston & Lunt, 
1994). Media, as an ideal site for such kind of "public sphere," or at least a new form 
of social interaction and conversation in a modem society (e.g. TV and radio talk 
shows, panel discussion, electronic town meetings, and so on), provides a possibility 
for the public opinion expression and discussion of issues of public interest. Thus 
media is not only a commercial operation but also a political institution. It has two 
communicative functions, on the one hand, the collection and dissemination of 
information and ideas and on the other, the provision of a forum arrangement for 
public conversation and debate. Through the process of reasoned debate among 
informed citizens (informed by the media) -the process called discursive formation 
(Wuthnow, 1989), the core of the discourse-centered theory of democracy~ 
"publicity" could be realized and a rational consensus could be built, which is an 
imperative part of a democracy society. 
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This theoretical formulation, however, has been criticized for romanticizing the 
media's democratizing function, especially neglecting the tensions and the 
contradictions between the market structure and state/corporate power relations. It is 
argued that media build a public forum only for legitimate interest groups and by 
probing into public thinking, it provides a new source of surveillance and feedback for 
power-holders (Murdock, 1992). It is also argued that the total commercialization of 
society, where market forces function as the best arbiter of the relationship between 
the media and the consumers of media goods and services, would result in the decline 
or even the disappearance of the public sphere (Elliott, 1982). Media privatization and 
the promoted consumerist ideology encourage people to seek private solutions or 
self-gratification by purchasing a commodity. Audiences are therefore urged to buy 
things in their own way and for their own interest rather than carrying out public 
conversation to improve the public interest and social change. 
In another perspective, audience has also been analyzed as sheer "spectators" of media 
events (e.g. Edelman, 1988; Altheide and Snow, 1991). Using stylized forms and 
informed by the "media logic," media create spectacles and dramas to amplify and 
dramatize the significance of real political events and therefore, to make politics more 
appealing to engage mass audience (Manning, 1996). In the world of media spectacles, 
the distinctions between media world and the reality are increasingly blurred. Politics 
no longer directly involves itself into people's everyday life, as the “ideal type" of 
democracy society; rather, it only exercises and practices itself on media and addicts 
itself into the category of media commercial drama. Audience, then, is built into the 
structure of the media and the political performance through the institutionalized role 
as observers, or sheer spectators (Debord, 1995). Instead, the roles of the political 
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actors and the spectators are clearly distinguished by media and the social distance 
between the two roles is symbolically increased. The implication is that the repeated 
perceptions of this distance would result in the “sense of deprivation," causing further 
political apathy, indifference and alienation, in other word, greater distance from 
politics. 
From the post-modernist point of view, audiences are not only "spectators," they are 
simultaneously the object of simulations and the disinterested subject of the 
circulation of indifferent social actions (Baudrillard, 1994). In the absence of 
collective identity, the result from the media continuous collapsing of the real into its 
simulated representations, the audience resists to take social actions. They are only 
constructed as a kind of abstract and false sociality, and serial unity is experienced as a 
negative totality (Kroker, 1992). 
Cultural Concept of Audience 
Audience also has its cultural meaning. One view on cultural audience is that they are 
victims of media's heavily copied popular culture. Media, especially television, in 
order to improve ratings to make more money, is providing a stage mainly for popular 
culture performance to flatter the audiences. The classics of a culture, however, are 
rejected and could hardly find a foothold in the mass media domain. Audiences, 
accordingly, are more and more accustomed or addicted to being entertained by the 
"copied culture." The dangerous thing is that they are likely to lose their reading and 
analytical abilities, which are indispensable to human logical reasoning. In this sense, 
audiences may well be "amused to death" (Postman, 1984). 
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An active conception of cultural audience, however, sees the audiences as creators of 
the popular phenomenon. They are fans of some kind of culture and they 
communicate their opinions through letter writing or fan magazines and through 
face-to-face contacts. As reference groups, they have considerable influence on the 
cultural content of media production (see Cantor, 1994). 
Another cultural meaning of audience is derived from its institutional economic 
conception. Through the interactions among the advertisers, media practitioners and 
audiences within the market-based institutional arrangement, two possible cultural 
implications could result. First of all, by the specialization of media content and the 
differentiation of media advertising target, the individuals are packaged and 
standardized into different cultural groups and divisions, each with a distinct lifestyle 
--a mixture of social status, cultural taste, geographical and psychological profiles. In 
this sense, media is a venue to collect and group individuals and create collective 
cultural identities for audiences. Audiences, therefore, are no longer individuals and 
single units in a “mass society," but as many grouped cultures, or cultural 
communities. 
From a different vantagepoint, however, we could argue, the whole society is therefore 
fractured into different segmentations, or in Turow's (1997) words, it is broken up into 
small slices of society. Promoted and encouraged by the ad-supported media, 
audiences separate themselves into more and more special groups and develop distinct 
media consuming habits and tastes. The implication is that the population is 
consistently fractured, in which individuals increasingly reach out only to people like 
themselves (for example, the fans organizations). In other words, serving as a way to 
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invent, sponsor and reinforce various cultural identities for an array of segments and 
communities, the media, together with ad firms, create a breakdown in social 
cohesion. 
The cultural conception of active audience is also challenged. One such challenge is 
from the critical school's criticism that such conception of audience is embedded with 
two presumed notions, that of absolute freedom of choice and absolute subjectivity of 
the cultural product consumers. Audiences, they argued, are endowed with a "false 
free will" which entrap them into the so-called free global marketplace which in fact is 
full of American cultural products charged with their own dominant middle-class 
ideology. What the idea of free flow of information does promote, therefore, is a 
single cultural mode sponsored by the alliance of the money principle and technology. 
As a result, cultural imperialism or cultural hegemony would win out within the 
temporary tension between the cultural pluralism and global commercialism. 
Audiences then, are culturally homogeneous and they all wear the ready-made clothes 
of the same ideology. 
Whether they are images of information receivers, media product consumers, 
audience commodities, citizens in democracy society, spectators of political spectacle, 
cultural victims or social slices, all of these notions add complications to 
differentiating various conceptions of audience. Still, we can view all the notions of 
audiences to be interconnected. More importantly, in spite of the differences among 
all these conceptualizations, they have something more fundamentally in common. 
Economically, the concept of audience articulates with the dominance of market-
based capitalism; politically, it associates with the modem nation-state practicing 
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liberal democracy; culturally, it represents the tendency towards cultural segmentation 
and presumed pluralism. However, all these conceptions are constructed in the same 
context. They are scholarly extractions of media practices in a market-based media 
system operating in liberal democratic societies. 
Another qualification is that although the conceptions might have emerged 
sequentially in the scholarly literature on mass media,^ their presence in the related 
media practices, however, is more likely to be simultaneous. In other words, at the 
time when scholars were talking about audiences as “receivers,” media professionals 
and advertisers treat the audience as consumers. Similarly, the audiences were also 
locked into an institutionalized role relationship with other actors in the media arena. 
That is to say, all these images of audiences are constructed through concrete social 
practices under a specific media institution. Audiences are information receivers 
because media are the information senders; audiences are consumers of media 
products because media are the purveyor of the commodities; and audience are "coin 
of exchange" because media are the dealers with advertisers. In other words, all 
images of audiences exist as (not in) relationship within (not with) a particular media 
institution (Ettema & Whitney, 1994) and are associated with institutionalized media 
practices. 
The Reification of Masses and the Birth of Media Ideology 
None of these conceptions of audience found its way to Maoist China, where media 
2 Reviewing the literature in mass communication, we can find that chronologically, audience was first 
characterized as "information receiver" in the model of information flow, typically in Shannon and 
Weaver's work. With the development of the field, the scholars started to develop the concept along 
other theoretical dimensions to examine the economic, political and social meanings of the concept. We 
can find empirical evidence of such argument in the year sequences of those publications on audience 
research. 
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were conceived an indispensable component of the Party organization and an 
ideological apparatus for the Party to carry out its revolutionary mission. As a matter 
of fact, although modem newspapers were initially transplanted from the West to 
China more than 150 years ago, the term of "audience {shouzhong)" did not appear in 
China's journalistic vocabulary until twenty years ago], when China started moving 
towards economic reforms and opening to the West. In Maoist's era (1949-1976), 
even the term "newspaper readers (baozhi duzhe)” were rarely used in Mao's 
discourse on journalistic work or in the discourse of media practitioners. Instead, 
those addressed by the media were "masses (qunzhongy, or "people (/enmin);, the 
preferred terms in Maoist political discourse. 
This is more than choosing from synonyms of audience. Rather, the preferred terms 
are highly politicized concepts, resulting from the production of the Maoist ideology 
and functioning as a starting point for establishing the "commandist" media system 
(Lee, 1990). With the idea of “masses，” media became simply a venue to construct, 
objectify and strengthen the Communist Party's domination over people. In other 
word, such a concept functioned as the discursive arm for the communist authoritarian 
regime. 
Clearly, such a notion of masses in China's specific context is very different from what 
was defined in western countries. There, the term of "masses" (or mass) is associated 
with the idea of “mass society," which emerged as a product of the industrialization 
and urbanization in the late twentieth century (Shils, 1975). In the western context, 
3 The word audience was included in several dictionaries labeled as "Chinese New Term Dictionary", 
which was claimed to collect all the new words and phrases emerging after 1979，the year as a turning 
point for China to start its own economic reform. 
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the concept of "mass" refers to the aggregate of individuals who have individual 
interests and individual needs and engaged in production and consumption activities 
in market situation. Accordingly, the idea of "audience as a mass" accentuates the 
typical features of mass production and distribution of news and entertainment. More 
significantly, as Denis McQuail (1997) comments, such a characterization reflects 
western values of individualism and a pessimistic view of modem industrial society, 
- a fear of depersonalization, irrationality, manipulation and decadence. 
While "masses" or “mass，，in western context is basically an individualistic concept, in 
China, such a concept is clearly based upon collectivism. Put in a broader context, the 
term of “masses” was a historical sediment of ideological construction of the Maoist 
era. Borrowing William (1976)'s characterization, it was a keyword in the Maoist 
society. Of course the concept is not a coinage created by Mao himself. Nor did it get 
currency only after 1949 when Mao came to power in the mainland China. Instead, it 
is a result of the highly politicizing and radicalizing intellectual current, advocating 
the "mass culture" and "mass literature" by the enlightenment intellectuals-
especially those leftist writers -- for ideological mobilization in the late 1920s (Yu, 
1993; Wu, 1999). Several major discussions on the related subjects held in 1930 and 
1932 were widely regarded as the beginning when the generic meanings of “masses” 
was formally translated into its ideological significance. However, it is Mao who 
redefined the concept of masses as a functional sector to legitimize the Communist 
Party and its power hierarchy and promoted it as a keyword in his era. 
As a matter of fact, through numerous essays, commentaries, talks, Party documents 
and even new poems, Mao had developed a rich vocabulary which has in many ways 
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changed the modem Chinese lexicon. New terms carrying new ideas came into 
popular usage. They also gave the Chinese people a new manner of thinking. For the 
idea of masses, to large extent, it anchors the whole set of Mao's discursive 
reconstruction of China's history and his redefinition of China's social reality and 
social relations in his time. In order to efficiently mobilize the people to create a 
totally new society, Mao had to supply the justification for the social revolutions and 
first of all, basing the legitimacy on the total redefinition of old China. With his 
supreme political power, Mao turned himself into a discursive agent for the whole 
China. As a great storyteller, Mao rewrote China's historical experiences, 
transforming "tradition" into "feudalism," "customs" or "religion" into "superstition," 
“moral order" into "feudalistic ideas." Using this new system of terminology, Mao's 
version of China's old regime was so negative that it should be thoroughly rejected 
(Cohen, 1993). Mao also reformulated China's social conflicts and power relationship 
at that period. As the "myth creator” with all-powerful authority, Mao's symbolic 
statements, with class analysis perspective, prescribed the whole vision of the mass 
recognition on it. 
Paradoxically, the concept of "masses", in Mao's class analysis, mixes two 
distinguishable yet contradictory meanings. First of all, "masses" is a "commendatory 
term." It is presumed as a positive or potentially positive social force for the historical 
progress, or in Raymond Williams's (1976) characterization, the subject of social 
action. Getting a close look at Mao's conception of masses, we could interpret it as 
Mao's "project of alliances" aiming at economic, political, and cultural change in 
Chinese society in a particular historical period (Fogel & Zarrow，1997). As a 
historical unity, "masses," in Mao's ideology, is the ultimate source for the Party's 
2 5 
power. Secondly, the concept of masses is also a derogatory term, which depicts the 
image of mobs who are "ignorant," "inferior," "disorganized," "unstable," “in the grip 
of ugly and fundamentally useless customs," and therefore desperately in the need of 
enlightenment and education by the Communist Party. By this dual conceptualization 
of masses, Mao managed to invent the collectivist consciousness and consensual 
ideology for mass mobilization. It became a symbolic device to blur the distinction 
among different interest groups and eliminate the alternative imagination of further 
social differentiation. Workers, peasants, intellectuals or petty bourgeoisie were 
thrown into the same category of masses, or qunzhong in Chinese. With such abstract 
characterization, the Chinese people were co-opted into the communist totalitarian 
system and forced into the Party's discourse of political strategies. 
So considered, on the one hand, Mao redefined the social members and the 
relationship among them (now they had identical and collective identity of "masses"). 
On the other hand, "masses" was set as antithesis against the category of Party 
members within the Communist regime and in a way, it reconstituted China's basic 
social relations as Party-masses relationship, more precisely, as Party's domination 
over masses. The Party is the decisive leadership organization and the locus of 
consciousness and authority in society while the masses are followers who are 
governed by the Party. In other words, as a formalized and restricted political code 
(Schoenhals, 1992), the concept of masses helps to constitute the structure of power 
within China's political system. 
Both notions of masses are clearly identifiable in the Party's policies and strategies to 
educate and mobilize the masses while at the same time to rely on the masses' 
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collective consciousness and actions to increase the validity of the Party's power. 
When directly extended to the discourse on media's roles and functions, the concept of 
"masses" undoubtedly alleviates the sender-receiver relationship in the information 
flow. Instead, what it stresses is the almost exclusive relationship between the Party 
and the masses as the ruler and the ruled, the leader and the follower, the educator and 
the educated, the agitator and the agitated. Masses are not receivers of information, 
but on the receiving end of the Party's dictatorship. They are the objects - who could 
be constituted and transformed by the Party ~ rather than the subjects of revolutionary 
change. As ignorant and inferior masses, they are surely not agents of meaning 
production. Rather, they are an uncritical aggregate who must be protected from 
alternative and "erroneous" ideas and ideologies and should be enlightened by the 
Party. 
This conception of masses was first of all revealed in the titles of the Party newspapers. 
After 1950, although most Party newspapers were given name by their specific 
province or city names (e.g., Beijing Daily, Guangzhou Daily, etc.), some other Party 
papers at both the central and local level were entitled or re-entitled based upon the 
class identification and the occupational differentiation of the masses. The number 
one official newspaper was named People's Daily (people are often used 
interchangeably in Mao's writings and the official Party documents). There were also 
newspapers called Worker Daily, Peasant Daily, Chinese Youth Daily and so on. The 
reader position and identity associated with each newspaper were thus defined by the 
Party's classification of the masses. In other words, the Party differentiated, though at 
the minimal level, the masses into several social groupings and assigned each group to 
specific newspapers. In this sense, the reader formation in China was through the 
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process of ideological identification rather than sociological classification. Such 
identification is quite different from that in the Western countries, where audiences are 
elaborately segmented by advertisers and marketers based on people's demographics, 
psychographics and lifestyle (Note: this is not to say the latter is not an ideological 
process). 
Woven together with such conception of “masses” were the ideas for institutionalizing 
the media as an indispensable component in the Party's revolutionary machine. The 
role defined for media is to establish the bond between the Party and the masses. 
Media are to constitute and reinforce the Party-masses relationship. They should be 
the Party's "mouthpiece" to back up the political discourses the Party produced and 
educate the masses on behalf of the Party. Through the Party-controlled media, the 
Party-state might be able to penetrate local society to totally control the personal life 
of its political inhabitants (Liu, 1971)，one essential part of the Communist state 
building. 
Mao produced considerable discourses on this. His formulation on the "Party-
masses" relationship within the press was gradually formalized during the 1940s. His 
comments and numerous talks to media workers are as historical sequences which 
telescope, supplement and enrich each other. They were meant to be not only the basic 
paradigmatic texts for the PRC's first generation of journalism editors and journalists 
to be taught the role of the press, but also the texts to be studied and internalized by 
new generations. In Mao's discourse, media were commanded to "educate the masses 
(jiaoyu qunzhong、，” to "rescue people from ignorance {shi renmin likai yumei 
zhuangtai),'' to "serve the people {wei renmin /www)", to "organize the masses {zuzhi 
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qunzhong�,” to "turn Party's policies into actions of the masses {ba dangde zhengce 
huawei qunzhong de xingdong)" and to strengthen the connections between Party and 
the masses (jiaqiang dang he renmin qunzhong de lianxiy, (Mao, 1983). All of these 
quotes are Mao's credos created in the formative years of Maoist media ideology. 
Mao made this institutional function of the media most clearly in his "Talks to the 
Editors of Jinsui Daily" in April 1948. In this talk, Mao summarized newspapers' 
propaganda work during the war: “ (T)he function and power of newspapers come 
precisely from their ability to bring the Party's program, the Party line, the Party's 
general and specific policies, its tasks and methods of work to the masses in the 
quickest and most extensive way" (Mao, 1983). This talk, together with other Mao's 
talks, essays, letters and notes, constitutes the defining guidelines for Party-press 
ideology after 1949, some of which are still heavily guarded journalistic cannons even 
today. 
Indeed, such a discourse has been repeatedly articulated in official statements, even in 
the writings of those more reform-minded regulators and officials after Mao's death. 
In 1983，with the rapid development of television, the Party officials stated that the TV 
broadcasting as "the most powerful tool to educate and encourage all the people to 
build socialism," was also “one of the most effective tools for the Party-state to 
maintain close links with the masses." The Party asked that “all levels of the Party and 
government departments should leam to utilize television broadcasting to publicize 
policies and to organize the masses.”斗 Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, the two post-
Mao leaders considered most cosmopolitan and reform-minded, also reiterated such 
views when they were in the position of the Party's General Secretary. For example, 
4 In the section of Party's policies and regulations on the journalistic work, Chinese Journalism 
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Hu Yaobang defined the role of the Party journalism as "the Party's mouthpiece," and 
the main task of it is simply "to use a vast quantity of vivid facts and speeches 
promptly and accurately to promote the ideas of the Party.”； Similarly, Zhao Ziyang 
articulated on the fiftieth anniversary of the National Journalist Association in 1987 
that “we should give full play of the media apparatus to publicize, organize and 
educate the masses, and to carry out the task along the basic line enacted in Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party.,’6 After 1989, Mao's formulation was brought up again and was directly and 
widely cited by the Party officials (Yuan, 1997). Jiang Zemin used Mao's discourse of 
"statesman to run the newspaper" in 1996 to emphasize the politically defined role of 
the media/ All these statements, although with different expressions and emphases 
during different periods, to a large extent asserted what Yuan (1997) characterized as 
"the established view of the Party's media ideology." 
The Institutionalization of Masses 
Of course Mao's media ideology could not live for a long time in a social vacuum 
without the process of institutionalization. The relationship between ideology and 
institution is twofold. On the one hand, ideology, as Schurmann (1968) argues, as a 
systematic set of ideas formulated in formal rules and policies, does lead and prescribe 
action consequence which serves the purpose of creating the institutions. Clearly, as a 
conceptual category, "masses" is central to the establishment of the system and 
institutions of the Party-state's "ideological apparatus" (Althusser, 1971). In a way, by 
banning other ways of ideological expression while making itself the sole legitimate 
Yearbook, 1984, P7. 
5 Hu Yaobang, "On the Party's journalism work," People 's Daily, August 14, 1985, pi. 
6 "Congratulation letter from Zhao Ziyang," September 30，1987. In Xinjiang Journalistic Circle, 1988 
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medium of political expression, the idea of Party-masses relationship helps to create 
China's media institutions, and give the role of the media an ideological base to be 
created and developed. 
On the other hand, the representation, stabilization and diffusion of an ideology also 
need sponsors of formalized institutions, certain social structures and routinized social 
practices, the process I would define as the institutionalization of an ideology. Put in 
another way, institution is essential in sustaining an ideology and giving it currency 
among the public at large. At the institutional level, Mao's media ideology was first of 
all embodied in concrete language of numerous specific policies, which were 
represented in the form of documents and regulations. For example, 124 instructive 
rules and regulations between 1950 and 1956 were included in Collections of Party，s 
Documents on the Journalistic Works (1980).^ These written texts with illustrations of 
test cases, reified Mao's media ideology by fixing media organizational structure and 
disciplining or rectifying its routine operations. After 1978, more regulations were 
enacted to comprehensively confine the media production within the ideological and 
policy framework of the Party (Yuan, 1997). 
Secondly, such media ideology was substantiated in the hierarchy of institutional 
arrangement. As an arm of the Party, media must submit to the direct leadership of the 
Party's Propaganda Department, an ideological as well as administrative supervisor of 
all the symbolic production. It was not until 1987 that the State Press and Publication 
Administration (SPPA) was re-established, taking over the regulatory and 
(1). 7 See People's Daily, January 2, 1986，pi. 
8 Edited by the Journalism Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (1980). Beijing: Xinhua 
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administrative activities from the Propaganda Department (Polumbaum, 1994). 
However, by translating Party's ideological principles into administrative regulations 
enforced by the State apparatus, the Party made it possible to institutionally continue 
its ideological hegemony on media (Pan, forthcoming). 
Basically, the function of the above two institutional aspects was to help formalize the 
relationship between the Party and the media. However, as far as the institutional 
relationship between the media and the masses is concerned, or we could say, the 
Party-masses relationship within the media, other three institutional arrangements 
should be highlighted: 1) the establishment of “masses work department" within each 
media organization and the related institution of "letters from the masses;" 2) media 
controlled correspondents network as “masses net", and 3) "study group" as social 
settings in each Chinese “work unit (danwei)" and the political ritual of "reading 
newspapers,，(Chu, 1977; Lynch, 1999). These institutional arrangements were 
designed to constitute a control system as well as a feedback mechanism for the 
structure of Mao's media ideology. Certainly, each arrangement had its specific 
functional significance in institutionalizing the Party-defined concept of "masses." 
Letters from the Masses 
The institution of "letters from the masses" was contrived to act out the Party-
governed publicity. After 1949，each media organization~almost all media now 
became "Party organs"~was required to establish "Masses Work Department 
(qungongbuy, in the internal structure of the organization to handle "letters from the 
Press. 
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masses (qunzhong laixin)"^ By encouraging people to write to the newspapers about 
their suggestions, complaints and criticisms, the Party aimed at activating an 
important source of "public opinion" (Schurmann, 1968)，crystallizing public 
sentiments and creating a controlled "extended democracy" through the media. By 
publishing the letters after appropriation or even severe tampering, on the other hand, 
the Party utilized the letters for political manipulation. 
In a way, the letters objectified or embodied the Party-defined concept of "masses." 
The flow of the letters had three different destinations (see Song, 1998). First, 
extracts of selected letters were published in a regular newspaper column or aired in a 
regular program of the radio broadcasting to represent "the opinion from the masses." 
Most of such letters were attached by a piece of comment or editorial, which would 
either help to prompt some policy statements, or symbolically rectify some social 
problems (of course with the authorization of the proper Party committee).� The 
extracts of some letters were collected and submitted to “the top authorities 
(shangtouy in the form of “internal references (neican)''^^ Most of them promulgated 
the problems in their workplace or within their neighborhood and the media was 
regarded as an appealing channel for their complaints. Still some of the letters were 
9 The naming machnism for the media organizational settings had experienced historical changes, with 
ideological implications. For example, in 1950, the Chinese Central Radio Broadcasting established a 
department called "receiver relation department {shouyinyuan bumen). It was renamed as "masses 
letters department (qunzhong laixin zu) three years later. In 1995, it again was reorganized and named 
as "audience. “ (Song, 1998). � For this, Michael Schoenhals (1992) has a detailed investigation on how Hu Qiaomu, then as a 
intermediary between the People 's Daily and the Central Secretariat of the CCP, wrote "the Word from 
Editors" attached to the "letters from the masses" on the People，s Daily during 1950s. In chapter 4 
Direction of the press: Hu Qiaomu's 1955 breakfast chats, Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: 
Five Studies. As a matter of fact, Hu was very conscious of tactically dealing with "masses letters." In 
July 1950，in one letter to Fan Changjiang, then the Chief Editor of People 's Daily, Hu suggested the 
editors to annotate after every letter about how the problems in the letter were settled, where the letter 
was transmitted to and who might take responsibility to give a reply. See Hu Qiaomu (1999)，Hu 
Qiaomu: Essays on Journalism and Publications. Beijing: People Press. 
”In 1952, Hu wrote to Fan Changjiang and other Chief Editors at People 's Daily and he suggested to 
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passed on to corresponding Party or government departments to seek solutions to 
specific difficulties in people's daily life. Such institutionalized practices also 
demonstrate that it was part of the "social facts" for media practitioners, readers, and 
the Party officials that the press was an administrative branch of the Party-state. 
Indeed, the newspapers had long been employed as part of a sophisticated "power 
management” to assume such an administrative and organizational role under the 
Party (Cheek, 1989). 
Newspaper was not simply designed as a peculiar enclave for the Party members to 
study the updated policies as well as the terminology of the Party's ideology. Instead, 
it was also designed as a thermometer of public opinions and an effective device to 
collect the opinions of the non-members ~ the wider strata of the masses ~ including 
workers, intellectuals, peasants and other social members. Through the ritual of 
publishing the letters, Mao's political communication was formalized, though 
probably only at the surface level, to provide ordinary people with opportunities to 
participate in national political life. Consequently, it might help to facilitate a de-
emphasis on commands, coercion, material incentives and other Party control 
techniques and help to get effective compliance by leading and mobilizing political 
enthusiasm and involvement among the people. In addition, it also played a role in 
social control, in detecting and criticizing the behaviors in social life that the Party 
deemed as "deviant." 
However, such an idealized institution had inevitably been frustrated by turbulent 
Chinese politics. During the Cultural Revolution, the column of "letters from the 
add one column in Everyday Matters (the internal reference of People 's Daily) to publish some letters 
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masses" was cancelled replaced by the column named "Red Guards Battlefield" and 
"Workers, Peasants and Soldiers' Battlefield," a symbolic arena to twist public 
opinions and suppress the masses. The column of "Letters from the masses" did not 
appeared again on People，s Daily until November 1976, one month after the fall of the 
“Gang of Four”(Chen，2000). In search of masses' linkage and support, other official 
newspapers and electronic media were also asked to renew the “good tradition" of 
letters from the masses. In May 1981, the Research Group of "Letters from the 
Masses" (duzhe laixin yanjiu xiaozu) was founded by the official Beijing Journalism 
Society. They even published a book in 1985 called Voices from the Bottom of the 
Heart: Selected Letters to the Capital Press 
Masses Correspondents 
Newspaper correspondent network was designed to make the system of control over 
the bureaucracy more workable. To a certain extent, as Schurmann (1968) labeled, 
China's newspaper correspondents at that time were kind of “spies.” They were not, 
in Tuchman's (1978) term, the kind of alternative information gatherers in a 
hierarchical system of news net dispersed by the commercialized media for the 
purpose of appropriating geographic territoriality, organizational specialization, and 
topical specialization to attract the audience interest. Rather, Chinese newspaper 
correspondents basically acted out the role of spot checking on state agencies. 
A policy announced in December 1950 reminded us that as early as the CCP，s seizure 
of state power, the Party had already asked the newspapers to recruit more 
correspondents (tongxunyuan) from two main resources: 1) among the professional 
from the masses. See Hu Qiaomu (1999). Beijing: People Press. 
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propagandists in government bureaus at all levels of the state ideological apparatus (of 
course they were not nominated and appointed by the media, but by the government); 
2) among politically reliable staffs in each organizational unit]� The duties of these 
two kinds of correspondents were defined as: to observe the operations of the offices 
and the behavior of the officials; to collect the "opinion of the masses" on policy, laws, 
and operations; and to propagandize Party's policies (Schurmann, 1968). After 
experimenting for two years, in 1953，the regulations were formally promulgated. 
Spying over the state agencies was thus openly built into the organizational system via 
media correspondent institutions. 
Clearly, the Chinese concept of ‘‘tongxunyuan (correspondent)" connotes an 
attenuated relationship to the news media, while it affirms an ideological role 
relationship for the Party. Those correspondents had dual identities. On the one hand, 
most correspondents were "from the masses," as the Party required. They were not 
formal employees within the media organizational structure, but typically were in a 
government job or other propaganda department in their working place. On the other 
hand, however, they were certified as media correspondents, certified to do some 
interviews and get easier access to some resources, and more importantly, they were 
requested to write to the papers regularly as a major task rather than a part-time work. 
Moreover, their work role was not stringers to alert the media to news occurrences in 
more specific organizations, nor did they work as specialist correspondent, as in the 
Western media category of foreign correspondent, political lobby correspondent, 
crime correspondent, fashion correspondent and so on (Tunstall, 1971). Rather, they 
12 Published by the Workers Press. 
B See "An announcement by the News Bureau of the Central Government on Developing the People 
Correspondents, December 26, 1950," in Documents of Chinese Communist Party on Journalism Work 
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should be regarded as the "nerve ending" of the Party to fish for the problems of the 
state agencies at a lower level as well as the mass opinions from the grass roots. In 
other words, the correspondents network was an extension of the Party's control 
apparatus for the Party to check out various social problems. They made spot checks 
on state agencies and the masses and functioned as a network of informants reporting 
to the top what was going on inside the apparatus. Therefore, we could say that the 
media organization and the correspondents did not have a direct organizational 
relationship (within the media), but they did have the kind of institutional relationship 
(in the Party's power structure). As a result, what was really established was a more 
delicately stratified hierarchy of the whole control system of the Party. 
Mass "Reading Groups “ 
"Reading newspaper group" was engineered as part of the institutional system to back 
up the key words that the Party produced (Cheek, 1989). It is also a day-to-day routine 
communication for the Party to manage people's mind and involve them into the 
politics in everyday life. Scholars on Chinese issues have all observed and analyzed 
the phenomenon, elaborating on the role of the study groups (see Chu, 1977; 
Schurmann, 1968; Whyte, 1974; Lynch, 1999). 
In Mao's era, large parts of the masses were organized into small study groups, most 
of which overlapped with the lowest administrative subdivision of a particular 
organization. The group members met on a regular basis, typically once a week. In 
such weekly study sessions, newspapers were read and the political issues were 
discussed along the agenda set by the newspapers. In a way, China's political 
(1980), Beijing: Xinhua Press. 
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communications down to the lowest level was formalized through such reading and 
discussing rituals. 
Newspaper articles constituted key documents for the orchestrated study and 
discussion sessions, and it presented the language to be used as well. The studying 
and discussion are part of the process of transforming the Party's ideological language, 
which underwrote the Party's legitimacy, into people's everyday language. Masses, 
through reading the newspaper in a collective setting and through the intensified 
discursive interactions with other group members, were trained to leam the “standard" 
political terms. They were also taught the "correct" way to understand Party's policies 
and gradually, they learned to talk about them in a "proper" way. Moreover, if the 
language of ideology is a set of signals, as Schumann (1968) argued, when the Party 
press used new terms to discuss problems, the readers, who were now trained to be 
sensitized to terminology and its changes, would interpret them as signals indicating a 
major policy change or decision. Through the study and discussion sessions, therefore, 
the intent of the Party's decisions were handed down to the people. 
The political rituals of reading newspaper were originally conceived in part as a device 
for institutionalizing in-service thought reform. As a matter of fact, by making use of 
the pressure of the “work units (danwei)" and especially the pressure of the small 
study groups, the rituals became an effective way for the Party to manufacture the 
public consent and the ideological compliance (Whyte, 1974). In the process of study 
and discussion, the collective consciousness of "masses" was bred, the recognition of 
the Party's power was exercised, and the "Party-masses relationship" was continually 
practiced and consolidated. 
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The consensus effect was especially notable when we know that the Chinese society 
had long been regarded as a "plate of loose sand {yi pan sanshd),” and the Chinese 
people had always been said too familialistic and clanistic to be nationalistic, as Sun 
Zhongshan characterized. To produce a relatively unified population, who were more 
responsive to the demands of the Party and more willing to be involved in national 
affairs, became a major task for the Party. The Party also tried hard to penetrate and 
control existing social groups and create new primary groups which encapsulate 
individuals, thereby gaining control over group norms and using such control to 
reinforce higher demands. The form of study group was therefore created to assume 
such function. In the study group settings, a political atmosphere was created and an 
effective group pressure was mobilized to encourage individuals to change their 
attitudes and conducts in order to conform more closely to the demands of high 
authorities. The significance of study groups, therefore, was in the attempt to unify 
and mobilize the Chinese masses through the reading newspaper ritual and help the 
social members to develop loyalty to the Party with the built-in obligations. The study 
groups and the political rituals of reading newspaper can thus be regarded as part of 
the institutional arrangement for establishing a top-down Party-masses relationship 
via mass media. 
Summary 
In short, first of all, “Masses Work Department" was a media organizational venue for 
the linkage between the Party and masses. Publishing the selected letters from the 
masses was to facilitate the Party to manipulate political communication and to 
mobilize the masses to take part in politics. Second, the network of the "masses 
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corespondents" formed a structural mediation between the media and masses. It was 
an extension of the Party's control apparatus for the Party to check out various social 
problems. Third, the "mass reading group" functioned to organize the masses around 
the linkage with the media. The groups had their internal structures and individuals 
were glued by the regular activities of "newspaper reading." Their activities were also 
enforced and supervised by the "work units" and the Party organizations. Through 
different mechanisms, these three institutional arrangements, together with other 
devices either within or without the media, constituted Mao's ideal design for Party's 
domination over the masses. 
However, only the very naive would contend that the reality of Chinese society under 
Mao's leadership could always live up to his ideal construction of such Party-masses 
relationship. Here, I do not intend to make detailed discussion on how fraudulent 
Mao's system is. I would propose, instead, that Mao's institution is based upon too 
idealistic idea of the collective consciousness among the social members while 
neglecting their self-interest drive. Also, the success of the whole thing Mao designed 
for the media institution rests on the supposed personal quality of Communist Party 
members and the journalists. This is of course not the social reality and consequently, 
such an institution would inevitably fail. 
Legitimacy Crisis 
When Mao's institution was rendered unfeasible by the distorted social structure and 
the uncontrollable social practices in the Cultural Revolutions, an ideological crisis 
arose, accompanied by political chaos and the loss of the Party's authority. All of a 
sudden, the old revolutionary theories and ideologies as well as the common discourse 
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lost their validity. The reflection upon the holocaust of "the Cultural Revolution" 
made it possible for another set of discourse to appear. From the late 1970s, the 
Chinese academic communities started to seek new theoretical resources. They 
expected to set up a new naming mechanism to break out of the encirclement of the old 
way of thinking and the old structure of discourse. In another discursive community, 
say, the official community of discourse, the reform-minded officials were eager to 
establish a new set of political formulations as the new legitimacy basis to accomplish 
the revision and the transformation of the dominant ideology and therefore restore its 
legitimacy and authority. Meanwhile, for the community of media practitioners, they 
also wanted to get the right to address reality. They needed a set of discourse to 
legitimize their own practices, which might run counter to the Party's principle. Thus, 
the alliance and convergence among the three communities were forged. The 
coincidence of differently motivated wishes of the three different communities to 
establish a new set of discourse (despite their purposes were surely at odds) turned into 
a creative moment and opened up space for the introduction, usage and circulation of 
the concept of "audience." 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE INTRODUCTION OF "AUDIENCE": 
LOCALIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION 
As one of the concepts constituting the modem idea complex in China, audience was 
also introduced from the West and gradually got its currency in China after 1979. Its 
introduction could be seen as an epitome of the unsettled political scene at that time 
when various western ideas were striving to penetrate into China and waged against 
Mao's discourse and ideology. Specifically, the concept of audience edged its way 
into odd comers of the hot journalistic debate between "the Party principle" and “the 
people principle." The debate involved political elite, academics as well as media 
practitioners. It is regarded as a symbolic turning point in media thinking and 
ideational change in post-Mao era (Gan, 1994). 
The idea of audience was first imported by route of an emerging academic field. As an 
academic term, it was transplanted from the Unite States along with mass 
communication as a field of academic research. The diffusion of knowledge across 
national boundaries is always more complicated, since knowledge, typically in 
Micheal Foucault's view, is produced within the structure of a particular social setting 
and consequently, bearing certain ideological implications and functions as a 
representation of the hierarchy of power. Nevertheless, knowledge could also remain 
autonomous enough from its social environment to acquire a broader, even universal 
and timeless appeal and thereby could be transplanted and localized to a very different 
environment (Wuthnow, 1989). 
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When a new idea is diffused, it takes its point of departure from a specific social 
context in which certain ideology is reproduced, selected, and institutionalized. When 
transplanted to a new social context, however, the new notion draws resources, 
‘ '？ . 
insights, and inspiration from the new environment, and makes itself relevant to the 
new environment. After going through several stages, the new notion may be adapted 
into the social system and achieve its own form while the new social conditions are 
themselves textualized and restructured by the new conception (Wuthnow, 1989). 
In the process of an ideational transplantation, therefore, two basic processes— 
localization and transformation~are involved. Here I define localization as a process 
to accommodate an alien idea to the local frame of meanings and to satisfy the specific 
local needs. In a way, such localization process is carried on along the spatial 
dimension. For the process of transformation, however, it occurs basically along the 
temporal dimension. By the concept of transformation, I refer to the process that a 
conception is specified, enriched or even changed to be adaptable to different 
historical and chronological junctures. 
Localization 
The introduction of an idea from a foreign land does not take place without the local 
imperatives. To understand how the concept of audience played an emancipatory role 
in China's media reforms, we must first see historically how it was introduced. The 
process took place in a larger political context of the CCP struggling to salvage its 
political legitimacy. In addressing the political crisis, the contesting forces in the 
power struggle inside of the CCP enlisted intellectuals to help develop discursive 
means that would mend the huge gap between the political doctrines and the changing 
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reality, thus igniting ferment in the academic sphere, typified in the far-reaching 
debate over "practice as the sole criterion of judging truth." In the media arena, the 
broad political upheaval and intellectual ferment were played out in the debate over 
the media's "Party vs. people principles." The debate, due to its intensive ideological 
charge, went into a wish-wash, but it cracked open a space for ideas that were not part 
of the ideological war. Against this backdrop, the concept of "audience," together 
with the ideas of "information," "media," "communication" and so on landed in China. 
The exact venue through which first Chinese media scholars and students and then 
media practitioners and policy makers encountered these new ideas was a tale of 
historical accident and inevitability. 
The Context 
At the local level, the introduction of the concept of audience coincided with CCP's 
efforts to survive the legitimacy crisis resulted from the 10-year catastrophic Cultural 
Revolution. The Cultural Revolution exposed the vulnerability of Mao's coercive 
ideology, resulting in an ideational vacuum. At that historical juncture, the Party's 
political and ideological legitimacy was only temporarily saved by blaming the 
radicalism of the Gang of Four for the destruction and turmoil of the Cultural 
Revolution. Everything was still in ruins and the political scene was highly uncertain. 
To salvage the Party from its legitimacy deficit, something more constructive was no 
doubt needed. Critically appraising the past and formulating a course of action for the 
future with the CCP still at the helm became the preoccupying task for the Party 
leaders and "the establishment intellectuals" (Hamin and Cheek, 1986). 
As a result, the first general discussion over the seemingly philosophical thesis on 
"practice as the sole criterion for testing truth" was mobilized by the Party and was 
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underway in every field in 1978 and 1979. This highly charged debate was a 
showdown between those who wished to maintain every bit of Mao's heritage and 
those who saw changing the course of actions as the only way to rescue the legitimacy 
of the political and ideological leadership of the Party. It also ridded the sainthood of 
Mao, and consequently, the taken-for-grantedness of his words. In this way, the 
debate fostered an atmosphere for change, both in discursive and practical domains. 
The economic reform was soon put on the Party's agenda as a shift of priorities from 
social revolution and gradually, the concept of "reform" emerged as a keyword in the 
society. 
The early 1980s still saw the intensive struggles between the conservatives and the 
more liberal reformists. Viewing the maintenance of Party hegemony and social 
stability as a prerequisite for economic progress, the conservatives preferred a 
moderate pace and limited scope for change. While accepting the need of incremental 
policy reform, they viewed fundamental systemic reform as dangerous. They argued 
that the Party's admission of past error must be limited and that criticism of the Party 
from the outside should be nipped in the bud in order to prevent exacerbation of the 
“crisis of confidence" in Party leadership and the socialist system as a whole. Those 
conservatives had attempted to "import" selective knowledge, funds, technology from 
abroad while severely limiting non-socialist cultural influence (Hamrin, 1986). 
At the other end of political spectrum, however, by 1983, the bolder reformists linked 
with Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang began pressing for even greater political relaxation 
to accompany the economic reforms far beyond anything previously tried in China. 
They encouraged intellectuals not only to criticize Maoist excesses but also to 
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question the Soviet-brand Marxist-Leninist dogma and the political-economic system 
imported from Moscow. At the same time, this group also began to stress the need of 
free exchanges of ideas at home and abroad, a more open political process, and freer 
lifestyles. They encouraged massive exposure of the Chinese elite and populace to 
non-socialist experiences and thinking through cultural exchange programs, training 
abroad, and looser media control. The atmosphere made it possible for more modem 
concepts and ideas, including communication and its associated concepts, to be 
introduced from the West. Certainly these liberal thoughts were attacked and by the 
leftist conservatives. However, the political repressions, manifested in the campaigns 
against "spiritual pollution" in 1983 and “bourgeois liberalization" in 1987, were all 
limited in scope and short in duration. Even after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, 
when the political control was rather tightened for quite a long time, the officials still 
announced its continued commitment to economic reforms and openness. 
In a way, the launching and deepening of the economic reforms made China less 
totalistic in the ideological arena, which had far-reaching implications for the media. 
Diversity and ideological laxity in the early 1980s were to some extent tolerated, 
which made it possible for various cultural genres, livelier media entertainments and 
other less ideologically loaded materials to flourish (Lee, 1990). For the media 
practitioners, they were undoubtedly in need of discursive justification for their new 
practices. The concept of “information” was highly promoted at that time. 
“Audience’，was also introduced. Upon the broader reform backdrop, the ideas of 
press freedom, increased professional autonomy and lessened Party control were also 
cried out. Drafting a national press law became a subject of intensive discussion 
before and after the CCP congress in 1987, which was hoped to insure 
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independence for the press and guard against arbitrary political interference 
(Polumbaum, 1990; White, 1990). One draft prepared by Hu Jiwei's team, the former 
chief-in-editor of People's Daily，even proposed to "stipulate the freedom of 
individuals to run privately owned newspapers.”！斗 
All these media reform proposals are unimaginable in Mao's era, although as early as 
1957, in the name of the so-called "free airing of views," some journalistic reform 
views had been put forward aiming at improving journalistic work. Wang Zhong, the 
then Director of the Department of Journalism at Fudan University, proposed the view 
of "reader-orientation," emphasizing the function of the media as to serve the need and 
the interest of readers. Clearly, his proposal was very similar to what was propounded 
as "audience-centered paradigm" in the middle of 1980s, except that the latter one has 
been carried out and to some extent accomplished. Wang Zhong's proposal and many 
such views were condemned as "rightist" by the severe anti-rightist campaign at that 
time. As a result, “leftist” thoughts prevailed and the proposed media reforms totally 
collapsed. The different fates of the same view - one in 1957 and one after 1978 -
therefore, at least indicate that different social context and power structure would play 
an important role in the nature and extent of the ideational change. 
The Academics 
The concept of audience first appeared in the academic domain in the early 1980s. In 
China's tradition, the academics have always been exploited as an instrument of 
political power struggle and the academic activities have long been subject to political 
criteria. This is especially the case of Mao's era. Even in the post-Mao era, most 
14 China Daily, November 25，1988. 
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reform-minded top-level politicians still took a fairly utilitarian stance toward 
academic research, assessing them by political criteria. Especially, the academics 
would become highly politicized whenever leadership tensions arise. The prominent 
reform-conservative cleavage among intellectuals clearly is a mirror of the same 
cleavage in the leadership, stemming from the inseparable link in the Chinese system 
between academic politics and politics in general. Such relationship between the 
academics and politics is revealing in the case of the localization process of the 
concept of audience. 
The late 1970s were dominated by those officials who sought legitimacy in continuing 
Mao's legacy and found support in the military, security, and propaganda control 
bureaucracies that had been Mao's base of power. After 1978, however, large number 
officials brought back by Deng Xiaoping sought the source of legitimacy in the Party's 
early successful efforts at development and organization in the 1950s (Hamrin, 1987). 
Later on, with the shift of priorities from social transformation to economic growth 
and the transfer of authority from the handful of remaining revolutionaries to a 
younger modernizing elite that extends beyond the Party, new leaders must 
increasingly rely on current performance criteria and less on the Party's glories as 
sources of legitimacy. The search for new grounds of legitimacy for the regime and a 
major redistribution of political authority has made the Party's relationship with 
academics particularly important in this period. The officials started to turn to the 
academics for new legitimacy resources. Consequently, there was a corresponding 
necessity of a limited academic relaxation, in order to produce news discourses 
favorable to the reform project. 
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Several disciplines such as sociology and international politics were re-established at 
that time, many official social science institutes were set up as well, and some new 
disciplines or research programs, including mass communication, were introduced 
from the western countries. All these newly-emerged disciplines, together with the 
old ones, were legitimized and urged to produce discourses more preferable to the 
Party's new reform program. Those scholars, together with the professional 
journalists, played an important role in manipulating, though within limits, the 
nuances of media discussion, raising sensitive issues, giving out their opinions, and so 
on. Although not all of these actors had the kind of historical awareness of pressing 
for further systemic reforms, they did play some role in influencing leadership 
decisions by providing research results as briefing internal reports on policy issues, 
social trends, and public reactions to the policies. In addition, they were enthusiastic 
to introduce some modem ideas and concepts from the West. Many academic books 
were translated and introduced into China and foreign scholars were also invited to 
come to China to give lectures. 
The Introduction of audience 
Against this historical backdrop arrived Yu Yelu, a Hong Kong based academic in the 
field of mass communication. Yu was instrumental in bridging the media scholars in 
China and American communication research]，Specific to the term of "audience," 
many Chinese media researchers who were introduced to communication in the late 
15 Yu Yelu was then a colleague of Wilbur Schramm's at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, where 
Schramm was helping to set up a graduate program. In May 1982, Schramm, accompanied by Yu Yelu, 
visited Beijing, Shanghai and other cities, where he gave several introductory lectures on mass 
communication. Yu was his interpreter. In my interviews, all most all the researchers now in the field 
of communication could well remember their first "cognitive shock" from hearing all the new concepts 
of communication in the lectures. I also checked the archives of past issues of the trade magazines in 
Chinese journalism and academic journals. Of all the publications, both formal and informal, that have 
mentioned in participants' memories or in my interviews, I have checked out 15 of them. 
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70s and early 80s recalled Yu's Chinese translation of Wilbur Schramm's Men, 
Message and Media: A Look at Human Communication. In this translation, Yu used 
Chinese shouzhong, or "receiving masses" to stand for “audience.，’i6 By 1979，the year 
when the official "reform and openness" program was inaugurated, the book was 
introduced to Chinese researchers and university teachers in journalism as a major 
reference book on "western journalism studies." Through this process, those who 
were exposed to the new knowledge system accepted the notion of audience as 
information receiver in Schramm's model (Zhang, 1983). Accompanied with this 
alien term were concepts such as media, information, feedback and so on (Li, 1995). 
The watershed event that all the participants whom I interviewed referred to was 
Wilbur Schramm's visit to China in May 1982. In this visit, Schramm gave a series of 
introductory lectures on communication research in Fudan University in Shanghai and 
the Institute of Journalism Research at the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 
Beijing. 
Together, these new terms formed an alternative framework for Chinese scholars and 
media professionals to look, think and talk about the med ia . 口 However, together with 
other alien and politically sensitive disciplines such as sociology and political science, 
this framework of communication was still rather weak in its ideological legitimacy in 
the heavily patrolled Chinese playing field of discourses. This problem was evident 
with the repeated assault on it or the imagined image of it by conservatives first in 
16 The translation itself is interesting enough for us to understand the localization process of a new idea 
or concept. The Chinese meaning of''zhouzhong" is "the receiving end." It explicitly expresses a 
passive meaning of the concept of audience. 
17 In 1998 when the Chinese researchers reviewed the past twenty years of communication studies in 
China, they tried to sort out the significance as well as the consequence of the introduction of 
communication as a discipline (see Xu, 1998; Ming, 1998; etc.). In my interviews in August 1999，most 
of them also regarded the communication as a revolution to the traditional Leninst journalism, and "it 
has provided some new ideas and a totally new way of think." 
50 
1983，i8 then in 1986-1987, and again after the student uprising in 1989. In each of 
these assaults, this assumed knowledge system was branded "western bourgeoisie 
journalism" and a "source of bourgeois spiritual pollution." Despite all these, this 
alternative framework was liberating because it blew open a discursive space for a set 
of new issues and concerns, and very rapidly, it was aligned with some of the newly 
emerged media practices, including the resurrection of media commercials and the 
increasing diversification of entertainment genres in the media (Li, 1995; Xu, 1998). 
Although the notion of audience was first introduced to a group of media researchers, 
its emergence could still be seen as a defining moment in the ideational changes in 
China's media reform. The recollections by some members of this group about their 
first encounter with this new knowledge system still convey the excitement and 
wonder nearly 20 years ago (Xu, 1998; Ming, 1998). Such ideational change involves 
a new "worldview" competing with an older but better established frame of reference. 
The competing process redefines crucial problems, introduces new methods, and 
establishes uniquely new standards for media operations. As a result, it has led to a 
major shift in both conceptual and practice sphere, something that is reminiscent of 
change in the "journalistic paradigms，，(Chan and Lee, 1991, pp. 23-24). Some even 
characterized it as a shift from the exclusively communicator-centered (i.e. Party-
centered) paradigm to an audience-centered paradigm (Ming, 1998, p. 10). 
The Debate 
Broadly speaking, the introduction of the idea of audience was built upon China's 
18 In April 1982，even the reformist Hu Yaobang proposed in his report On the Thought Political Work 
that "news is ideological and it cannot be without class character." He said that "we can report the news 
about the scientific researches and advanced management developed in the capitalism world, but as for 
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specific social context as I have discussed above, and the concept is also a product of 
the dynamic interactions between academics and politics at that time. More 
specifically, I would highlight here the debate on the "Party's principle" and the 
"people's principle，”i9 an academic debate in journalistic domain which was soon 
expanded to the political domain in the early 1980s. Given that the authority finally 
privileged one point of view, to academics and media professionals, the debate did not 
lead to a satisfactory resolution. It nevertheless opened up a conceptual crack in the 
official discourse for the importation of the notion of "audience" to. Ideologically, this 
debate also primed and made conspicuous the inapproporiatiness of the idea of 
"people" or "masses" in journalistic discourse, and made the concept of "audience" a 
logical alternative to legitimize the reform practices of the media. 
Indeed, in China's modem history, almost every social revolution or social reform 
started with ideational debates in the academic or other discursive fields before it 
entering into the real practical domain. Each debate is produced in a specific social 
setting and functions for a certain ideological purpose. We can easily find outstanding 
examples: the debates on "democracy" during the landmark May Fourth Movement of 
1919; the debate on "truth criteria" in 1978; the debate on "market economy" in 1992 
and so on. Of course we should differentiate two types of the debates: the top-down 
debate and the bottom-up debate. The former one is always mobilized by the top 
authorities in order to discursively justify their sequent reform actions, while the latter 
one is basically initiated by the critical intellectuals to call for more radical reforms. In 
the latter case, the debates may clarify some questions, although sometimes no 
its institution as well as its rotted ideological views, in no case could we appraise for it." See 
Journalism Yearbook, 1982. 19 In Chinese context, the concepts of "people" and "masses" are always interchangable. Here, is also 
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solutions are well reached. Raising more questions to be solved, however, they expose 
alternatives to the people and broaden the people's thought. 
However, the debate on the "Party's principle" and the "people's principle" seems to 
be more complicated than simply to be put into either type. The debate was initiated in 
the context of ideological ferment and political uncertainties that the Chinese press 
started to examine its own wrongdoing during the Cultural Revolution. Built upon the 
campaign against the "falsehood, exaggeration, and emptiness," the debate was soon 
heightened and involved all the academics and media practitioners. The central issue 
of the debate was whether the press ought to be a Party organ or speak for the people. 
The former is called the "Party principle (dang xing)” while the later the "people 
principle {renmin xing).” Hu Jiwei, the then director of the People ’s Daily and an 
active advocator for press freedom, brought the legitimacy to the question under 
debate. Hu asked the following basic question: When the Party makes a mistake, as in 
the Cultural Revolution, could the press, which is controlled by the Party and serve as 
the Party's mouthpiece, be able to make no mistake, or even help and supervise the 
Party to rectify and minimize the mistake? Obviously the answer for Hu is that if the 
Party is wrong, the press ought to speak for the people and represent their interests. 
Following this logic, the press should stand by and speak for the people by performing 
its "watchdog" role. Hu's argument carried with it an ideologically subversive 
implication. That is, representing the people may be in direct opposition to serving as 
the Party's mouthpiece. If so, there must be something fundamentally wrong with the 
political as well as the media system which gives the Party monopoly over the media. 
The debate resulted in a highly charged ideological battle. 
the case. 
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The debate also highlighted the concept of "people" or "masses"^® and differentiated 
that aggregate into different categories, not by profession but by political orientation, 
another kind of class identification. From the conservative point of Party principle 
(e.g. Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun, Wu Lenxi, etc.), the term "people" was a too general 
and ambiguous concept because within the people were advanced, backward, and 
middle-of-the-road elements, or in another labeling system, leftists, centrists, and 
rightists. They argued that the CCP press could stand only on the side of the advanced 
elements of the people to help educate the backward elements. The Party could not 
represent the backwardness within the people. As a result, the people principle could 
not be put before the Party principle. However, such argument was ftill of tensions 
and contradictions and it made the relationship between the Party and people rather 
complicated. As those who oppose this view argued (e.g. Hu Jiwei, Gan Xifen, etc.), 
although people could be differentiated, they were all people. They were the forces 
the Party had to rely on. They further claimed, never in our history did we advocate 
reliance on only one part of the people. Although journalistic workers might 
recognize the differences within people while tackling concrete problems, this should 
not prevent them from treating the people as a whole as a force for reliance (Gan, 
1994). 
The entire 1980s and the early 1990s had witnessed the discursive contestation 
between the Party and people principles. In and through this debate, "people" became 
a politically sensitive word with destructive power against the Party's ideological 
20 As I have discussed, the distinction between the two exists of people and masses are often used 
interchangeable in the official discourses. As Hu Jiwei comments, when he first put forward the 
question on the Party principle and people principle on the Conference of National Journalistic Work in 
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legitimacy. Some efforts were made by some scholars to force a marriage between the 
two but they all ended in ideological wish-wash. One by one, the proponents of the 
primacy of the "people principle" faced their political demise in a series of campaigns 
against the liberal reformers and their intellectual allies. Finally, Deng Xiaoping, the 
then paramount leader, pronounced that it was "unscientific" and "harmfiil to social 
practices" to give primacy to the people principle (Tong, 1994). Echoing and 
amplifying this pronouncement, Hu Qiaomu, then the Head of Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, insisted that serving as the Party's organ was the utmost norm for the 
media operation and there was no need to advance the concept of the people principle 
(Hu, 1986a; 1986b; 1998). After the student movement in 1989, the newly installed 
Party Chief, Jiang Zemin, reaffirmed this idea (Tong, 1994). 
Although the authorities prioritized the "Party principle" view, the answer was surely 
not satisfactory to the academics and media professionals. Along with the newly-
imported discipline of mass communication, the concept of audience squeezed in the 
conceptual crack of the official discourse. 
De-politicization 
The word "audience" originated from the ideological crisis indicated by the Party 
principle vs. people principle debate and gained its initial significance in different 
discursive communities of policy makers, media professionals and scholars basically 
as a term denoting information receiver. If the "people" concept clasps the political 
role of 'Party's followers/subjects" and the communicative role of "information 
receivers," the term "audience" separates the two and gives the latter the status of a 
1979, he was intended to "elaborate the relationship among the Party press, the Party and the masses." 
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distinct conceptual category. The new concept defines an aggregate of masses in 
terms of their media use behavior. As a result, in the Chinese context, it seemingly 
de-politicizes the relationship between this aggregate and the media, inserting a space 
not only between this aggregate of human units and the Party but also between media 
and the Party. With less social aggressiveness, "audience" was reconstructed as a 
“safe” concept, relatively easier to circumvent the ideological patrol in China's 
context. Partly because of this reason, the new concept did not resist the ideological 
orthodox head on and did not run into the kinds of overt assaults from the authority as 
some of the other concepts such as “media” and "communication." Rather, it 
managed to circumvent the ideological fortresses and moved on to restructure the new 
social relationships among the Party, the media and the audience. 
The concept of audience as message receivers, therefore, has double-edges. First, it 
avoided a head-on collision with the established concepts such as “masses，，and 
"people" and the ideological fortresses that they signify. It was a “third way" out of 
the antagonism between the Party and people principles. In addition, the seemingly 
de-politicized and value-neutral notion of audience could also be incorporated into 
Party's new interpretation of media's role at least partially in serving people's need. 
Within such a general conceptual framework, it is now possible to discuss the 
economic, sociological, psychological and cultural determinants of the media users 
without making an ideological risk. The concept of audience, together with the new 
concepts of modernization, reform, openness, commodity, information, and so on, 
constituted the Party's new set of political discourse in the post-Mao era when the 
CCP had to cling on continued increase in people's living standards for its political 
See Hu (1998), pl91. 
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legitimacy. 
Second, with the concept of audience, media reforms are led on a pathway toward 
media acquiring their own and relatively independent identities in that media now 
have another master to serve and this master is ultimately holding media's purse string. 
In other words, the notion of audience was a starting point for the media to depart from 
the exclusively politically determined role—the role in a top-down propaganda 
relationship between the Party and the masses—to relocate themselves in a context of 
an emerging market-oriented media system. In this sense, the term of audience 
functioned as a rhetorical device other than an academic concept. More exactly, it had 
acted to communicate an idea among the communities of media officials, media 
practitioners and communication scholars, rather than to merely define a category. 
Transformation 
As I have discussed above, the concept of audience gained its initial significance in the 
early 1980s basically as the notion of information receiver. The notions as consumer, 
public, citizen and other variations imbedded in the concept were not activated at that 
time. However, the de-politicized idea of "information receiver" constitutes a 
critically important part of the concept of audience evolved in China. More 
importantly, it formed the first stage in forging other variants, including those with 
explicit ideological implications. 
Certainly, the variable senses of "audience" were not developed within the term's own 
internal structure. Rather, they were determined and invoked by the precise social 
conditions in each historical moment of the reforms in China. "Audience" was a 
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vocabulary to be used and transformed as the interpreters in different discursive 
communities found it necessary making discursive justifications for their own social 
activities in different historical periods. In each period, a proper meaning which fits 
the argument was attached while other meanings inconvenient to fit in were 
contingently shelved. 
However, as evidence reminds us, such meaning transfer is neither simple nor final. 
On the one hand, earlier and later senses of audience are coexisting now, although they 
were first triggered by different practical imperatives and functioned in different 
discursive domains. On the other hand, the enriched meanings of audience together 
become an actual alternative to the idea of masses. To some extent, therefore, the 
course of the conceptual extension and transformation of the idea of audience bears 
witness to all aspects of China's media reform. 
Meaning Evolution 
The first conception of audience introduced from the West is "information receiver." 
Such a conception acquired substance when media practitioners took measure to 
improve their styles of reporting. Shortly after the downfall of the “Gang of Four,” the 
Chinese press, led by the chief Party organ, the People's Daily, started a campaign to 
"recover the glorious tradition of the Party press" and to annihilate the "falsehood, 
exaggeration, and emptiness" in the Party's newspapers (Li, 1995). The journalists 
advocated "short, plain and speedy" {duan ping kuai) as the three main characteristics 
of news reports as well as the criteria with which news reporting should be evaluated. 
The concept of "information" was then promoted as a popular word, although the 
notion of news as propaganda was still prevalent, at least in the political discourse. 
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With the legitimized notion of "information needs" and "informational openness and 
transparence" as a discursive cover, the volume of news available through the 
officially sanctioned mass media was dramatically increased. Disbanded publications 
were revived under the Party control and new ones proliferated. In 1979, the number 
of newspapers of all varieties was only 69, but by the end of 1983 it increased to 773. 
The number reached the new height at 1611 in 1987 {Chinese Publication Yearbook, 
1998, p53). Meanwhile, media content as well as media genre were considerably 
diversified. More entertainment appeared on the newspaper and TV became a major 
source of family entertainment and a distinctive form of mass culture (Yu, 1990). Also 
there were efforts made to unearth the "hot button issues" {redian wenti), i.e., issues of 
broad and intense public concerns, and to get closer to people's everyday life (tiejin 
shenghuo). Audience surveys and program ratings were conducted to diagnose the 
areas that need improvement. Being the object of those surveys, media audience 
received a novel form of attention by the media (Polumbaum, 1990). 
With the deepening of the economic modernization and political reform in the middle 
of 1980s, the conception of audience started to expand. All power players now were 
subject to the constraints of the prevalent reform discourse that they had to abide the 
rules of law. More statutes were enacted. Some civic institutions (although still very 
weak) emerged and the ideas of equality and citizenship to some extent gained hold. 
In the media domain, similar efforts were made to promote the idea of press freedom. 
Hu Jiwei (1986a; 1986b) asserted that journalism had its own "objective laws (keguan 
guilu)” and hence relative autonomy must not be subject to political doctrines and 
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ideological censorship. Based on this idea, Hu and his associates, for example, Sun 
Xupei, then the director of the Journalism Institute of Chinese Academy of Social 
Science (CASS), called for a press law.^ ^ Delegated by the People's Congress under 
Wan Li and Peng Zhen, Hu's team drafted one version in 1985. The draft proposed to 
set up an assessment council under the Education, Science and Culture Committee of 
the People's Congress (but not the CCP Committee) to steer and supervise the media 
work (Wei, 1999). Another drafting committee was also founded within the State 
Press and Publication Bureau at the same time. The main issues concerned "the 
supervision function of the press and the rights and obligations of reporters." Such an 
attempt was boosted by Zhao Ziyang's report on the work of the government to the 
13th Party Congress in 1987，which highlighted three principles of news work as 
“being a venue for the public opinion to monitor the Party's work {yulun jiandu)" 
"informing the people of important issues {zhongda shijian rang renmin zhidao)” and 
"providing forum for public deliberation {zhongda wenti rang renmin taolun、， 
Although the official discourse still used the term of "people" or "masses," the 
connotation embedded in it was surely very close to the modem notion of public. 
Zhao's report also remarked that “ [We] must enact press and publication law...and 
other statutes to safeguard the civic rights and civic freedom prescribed in the 
Constitution…”（Wei, 1999). Although the press law was finally derailed by the 
Tiananmen crackdown and is still unattainable today, nevertheless the ideas of 
“freedom of political expression" and “the right to know" came into use both within 
and without the media during that time. People were encouraged to write to the media 
21 As a matter of fact, as early as 1980 on the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, 
some people had already proposed to draw a press law and to guarantee the press freedom and civic 
expression. The proposal was formally submitted on the First Session of the Sixth NPC in 1983 and 
was approved by the Central Committee in 1984. See Wei Yongzheng (1999)，The Outline of Chinese 
Communication Law. Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press. 
22 For this part, Wu (1997) has made a detailed elaboration on the how the report was worked out and 
6 0 
and participate in some public issue discussions. The launching of the public opinion 
polls further extended the image of media audience as "public" and "civics" who had 
opinions on the reform agenda and the right to express such opinion. As a result, 
audience had got their political meaning by that time. 
In the economic domain, with the increasing potency of advertisement in media 
operations, audience gradually acquired their commercial value and their image as 
media consumers started to take root. The expansion of advertising business 
accelerated after 1992, when Deng Xiaoping in his tour to the southern special 
economic zone called for accelerated market-oriented reforms. From 1991 to 1998， 
the annual advertising billing increased more then ten folds, from 1 billion yuan to 
13.6 billion yuan.公 With this increase is the restructuring of the geographic reach and 
distribution of the media (see Chen, 1998a; 1998b). 
Media competition intensified. Readership and ratings became chips to bargain with 
advertisers. In practice, the newspapers made great efforts to expand the number of 
pages or to offer extra issues to carry more advertisement. To seize more audience, 
they also tried every way to cater to the more popular tastes of a wider readership. 
They undertook bold experiments to publish a variety of special editions on weekends 
and offered a preponderant amount of “soft news," less propagandistic information 
and more cultural entertainment. TV as a powerful mass entertainer started their own 
way to win the audiences. They invited audience to come to the studio to participate in 
the living broadcasting of game-playing programs. Involving the audience directly 
into their production process, the new program soon became welcomed. The local 
what kind of ideological implications and political impacts it had on the consequent reforms. 
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program in Shanghai TV called "Intellectual Surfing" {zhili da chonglang) is a good 
illustration. The program started in 1995 and has been the most popular entertainment 
program in Shanghai and now it retains a rating of almost 20%. 
In addition, numerous shopping guide programs also appeared on the TV screen. 
Together with those consumption magazines and consumption sections in newspapers, 
these programs directly promoted the consumer identity of audience and helped to 
construct the emerging consumer culture. The movement called "China 10,000-
kilometer Journey on Quality" (zhiliang wanlixing) is also notable. It was started in 
1992 and sponsored by the People 's Daily and other official media, including CCTV. 
The journalists toured as quality inspectors and the media made live broadcasting or 
series of reporting to interview the consumers and expose the bad products. Media 
thus became a key venue in the process of activating the image of consumers, not only 
teaching them to be wise in the market and leam to live a tasteful life, but also impart 
consumer rights and values on them (Davis, 2000). In the discursive domain, how can 
the newspapers and broadcasting media constitute and expand their audience in a 
market environment had become the central topic among media professionals and 
researchers. They started talking about audience segmentation, market niche, 
effective audience coverage, and so on (e.g., Yu, 1996a; Cao，1999; Huang & Ding， 
1999). All these ideas are related to the economic values of audience, adding the 
consumer and institutional roles to the concept of audience. 
Shifting Basis of Legitimacy 
The concept of "audience" has played a contentious double role. On the one hand, it 
23 Modern Advertising, No.3, 1999, p.8. 6 2 
was first introduced as the de-ideologicized notion of information receiver. On the 
other hand, such a notion actually articulates the Western "objective journalism," 
which conflicted with Mao's notion of propaganda as the role of the Party-press. 
Seeking a value-neutral understanding of the media role accurately reflects what had 
been going on in reform China. Started with this notion, the meaning expansion of the 
concept of audience is actually a re-politicization process. It is a process of changing 
and expanding legitimacy basis for media practices, especially for media content 
production. 
While the Party's dominant ideology had been the bible and the only legitimacy basis 
for journalists to judge the news values in Mao's era, corresponding to the popular 
idea of audience as information receiver, professionalism started to be included as 
another legitimacy basis for media work since the early 1980s. Professionalism is an 
ideational constellation, consisting of the concepts such as information, truth, fact, 
objectivity, accuracy, credibility, timeliness and so on. All these concepts are in sharp 
contrast with what was characterized as "falsehood, exaggeration, and emptiness," the 
reporting style serving naked politics during the depths of the Cultural Revolution. 
Such a change in the basis of legitimacy was particularly evident in a national-wide 
survey of Chinese journalists conducted in 1997 and with a sample size of 2002 (Yu, 
1998). Although “to help the people to understand the Party's policies (87.4%)" and 
“to guide the public opinion (84.4%)" were still in the top five commitments for their 
journalistic work, 91.2% journalists in the survey now held the view that "to promptly 
provide new information for the audience" is the utmost social function of the media. 
They also ranked "to report the newly-occurred events by fact (86.6%)" as the third 
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important media function. Obviously, the ideas of "information," "fact" and 
"audience" have became new legitimate components of the discourse on mass media. 
The survey also revealed that "the relevance to the people's life (91.0%)," "the 
timeliness of the news reporting (84.8%)" and “whether new information is provided 
(78%)" were ranked as the most important criteria for journalists to judge news values. 
Activated by the political reform and its related notion of public, media practitioner 
also recognized their multiple political roles. In the 1997 survey, although “to 
improve the social reforms promoted by the Party (91.8%)，，and "to be the ‘screwnail， 
of the revolutionary enterprise (73.9%)"were still among the top commitments for 
their journalistic work, 57.0% journalists in the survey now holding the tenet of "being 
detached from and independent of any interest group." Such an expression is a typical 
professional creed of media social responsibility in the western countries. 
The basis of legitimacy for media production was further expanded during media 
marketization. Other than Party's ideology as well as media professional ideas and 
media social responsibility, audience's commercial values were also thoroughly 
explored and became a very important, if not the most, legitimacy basis for media 
operations. To better "satisfy the audience's needs，，is almost the same thing as to sell 
the audience to the advertisers efficiently. 
In addition, the media practitioners are now good at employing new symbolic 
resources and improvising new practices to expand the boundaries of the dominant 
ideology (Pan, forthcoming). They are also good at translating politics into 
entertainment to get more economic benefits. The most prominent example is the 
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emergence of talk shows. As an introduced new media format, talk shows became 
especially popular after the success of "Telling the Truth {shihua shishuo),” a CCTV 
program started in March 1996 featuring a host chatting with invited citizens over 
issues in their everyday life. The ratings of that weekly program was between 2.83% _ 
3.01% in 1997, about 29.64 to 30.36 million viewers, much higher than most of other 
regular programs (Shi & Qiao，1999). Although the creative entertainment format of 
the talk shows was popular, some audience complained that the topics of the program 
were "too trivial and senseless," since most of the time they were talking on mundane 
everyday issues, such as how to deal with adolescence, who should pay for wedding, 
whether a couple needs to keep certain distance. However, these seemingly de-
politicized topics still bear much ideological implication, especially in the social 
transformation period in China. As Shi Jian and Yang Dongpin, the directors of the 
program, commented, "[S]urely we cannot touch much on the politically sensitive 
topics as what our foreign colleagues are doing, but we do attempt to open a broader 
space for our audience to participate in the discussion and give out their diverse 
opinions" (Shi & Qiao，1999). In a way, talk shows of the kind, although still in their 
embryo, is likely to be a rehearsal for media to create a real public sphere for the 
people. Media audience is hence rendered its treble images through this kind of 
programsentertained viewers, institutional consumers and public discussants. 
Hybridization: Mixing of Masses and Audience 
With these enriched meanings, the transplantation of the concept of audience to the 
Chinese context seems to be complete because we can now find in China all the three 
images of audience discemable in the western literature and media practices. 
However, this is only one side of the story. The other side is that the Chinese concept 
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of audience seems to be more limited in the scope of its currency. Because it continues 
to share the stage with the political jargons such as "masses" or "people," for some 
policy makers and media professionals, the distinction between "audience" and these 
jargons is to be ignored. They are used indistinguishably and interchangeably in 
political discourse as well as in media professional domain. Most of the time the 
media officials speak of the word of "masses" in the sense of audience. 
For others, the tension between the two meaning systems is reconciled in a series of 
dualism. For example, media outlets must aim at both “financial efficiency" and 
"social benefits," both phrases are the code words for profit making and political 
compliance (Song, 1994; Liang, 1992). In a newly-published semi-academic book On 
Chinese Broadcasting Audience (1998)，24 the term of audience appears everywhere 
and the commercial value of the audience is admitted. Much discussion is on audience 
surveys, media ratings, audience psychology and programming. However, the authors 
also discuss a lot about the Party's principles on the "audience work {shouzhong 
gongzuoy and they assert the necessity for the media to educate and direct the 
audience in the social transformation process. Here, audience seems to be still treated 
as Mao's masses. 
Still for others, the two meaning systems are meant to be invoked in different domains. 
In the domain closer to the ideological and political center (e.g. on news coverage and 
editorials), the concept of "masses" would take the front seat; in the domain closer to 
the market (e.g., on media's financial management), the concept of "audience" would 
24 Calling the book as semi-academic book is because the book was edited by the Audience Work 
Department of Chinese Central Broadcasting Radio, a book mixing some conceptual discussions and 
their own professional experiences. 
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take primacy. Take Xiao Pei, the former editor-in-chief of the Beijing Youth Daily, for 
example. In one of his articles talking about the problems the Beijing Youth Daily 
were facing,^^ in the first part when he talks about news reporting, the idea of the 
"masses principle" (qunzhong xin) in their propaganda work is emphasized. He 
argues, "We should insist on unifying the propaganda principle and the masses 
principle, ...making the news closer to the masses." In the second part on newspaper 
management, however, Xiao uses the term of "audience (zhouzhongy and asserts that 
“the needs of the audience is the basis to construct the newspaper's structure," “to 
attract more audience, to get more advertisement benefit." Clearly, using the two 
terms representing different media ideologies has become a delicate art for the media 
practitioners to get justifications for their activities in different domains. 
Along the temporal dimension, the use of the two words is also distinct at some critical 
moments. At moments of heightened political tension (e.g. the political storm in 1989, 
Hong Kong's handover in 1997，NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade 
in May 1999 and the crackdown on Falungong, a semi-religious self-healing sect since 
July 1999), the concept of “masses，，would become more salient in determining the 
kinds of media practices to be activated or adopted. One senior official at CCTV 
complained privately that while propagating the campaign against Falungong in July 
1999，CCTV lost more than 60 million yuan of its advertising income. The media 
coverage of this campaign also returned to the Maoist propaganda mode. Clearly, the 
Chinese media, now earning their bread and butter in the market, still serve as puppets 
of the CCP to educate and indoctrinate the masses as the Party's presumed loyal 
followers and subjects. The concept of "audience" has no grounding in a democratic 
25 Xiao, Pei (1998). Ten problems in the reforms of Beijing Youth Daily (In Chinese), Journalism 
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institution in China as it does in western societies. Consequently, it has clear 
ideological boundaries of applicability. 




THE LEGIMIZATION OF AUDIENCE 
A new idea inspires and prescribes new practices, which in turn reinforce and 
legitimize the new idea. When a new idea is first introduced, it contests with the old 
ones and faces two possible fates. One is that the old ideational system might succeed 
in suffocating the new idea. Backed by the cultural traditions, political control, and 
other social constraints, the old system may prevent the new idea from being 
congealed into practices, the process, borrowed from Chan and Lee (1991)’s 
characterization, could be defined as regression. The alternative is that the new idea 
may be coupled with newly developed social needs and practices to break through the 
existing structural boundaries and move towards stabilization. Whether an ideational 
change occurs in a minor or a revolutionary way, whether it is temporary or durable, 
and whether it results in a variety of social practices and therefore redefines the social 
reality, all depend on the nature and extent of the sociopolitical change, the 
configuration of the power structure, and the implementation of some routinized and 
institutionalized practices inspired and prescribed by the new idea. 
In China, the legitimization of audience surveys as an emerging practice and an 
institution in its own right helped to stabilize the idea of audience. However, just as 
the richness in meaning of “audience，” the name "audience survey" in Chinese lexicon 
is also complicated. In both the discursive and practice domains, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, "audience survey" is often mixed together with 
"public opinion polls" and “marketing research." "Audience survey" is used to denote 
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all three, a point clearly shown in a recent overview of the trade by one of its earliest 
proponents (Chen, 2000). Therefore, we need to discuss "audience survey" in this 
broad sense in order to chart more accurately the historical trajectory of the 
development of audience as recipients, consumers, and members of the public. 
Clearly, in western countries, although sharing the same methodological basis and the 
measurement techniques, the three kinds of surveys do express very different ideas, 
serve different purposes, and are distinguishable institutions with different historical 
trajectories. In China, it is another story. Although all three forms of survey research 
are found in China, they were developed in association with different aspects of the 
reforms. Audience research in the strict sense was started to promote the journalistic 
reform and then was quickly incorporated as an essential part of the detailed political 
reform program in the mid 1980s (Chen, 1991; Chen, 2000; Yu, 1996b). As a result, 
audience survey was more politically oriented than market-oriented at that time. It 
was wrapped together with public opinion polls from the very beginning and even 
until today, the distinction between them remains ambiguous. Many public opinion 
polls with explicit political implications were conducted under the label of "audience 
survey." Consumer surveys, although developed later, also grew out of the audience 
survey business. The distinction among these three concepts and their corresponding 
social activities is loaded with ideological implications. As a unique history probably 
not to be found elsewhere, the chronological development of the three social practices 
may provide a picture of the changing social conditions in which the ideas of audience 
were ramified, transformed and developed in China's reform era. 
In this chapter, I will analyze the three types of survey practices in China, tracing the 
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paths of their historical development and interpreting how each of them helped to 
shape and stabilize the three components of the concept of audience, information 
receivers, consumers, and members of the public. I will argue, and demonstrate, that 
through the institutionalization of the three kinds of surveys, the concept of audience 
took its foothold in China's changing social conditions and acquired its local 
meanings via the contextualized associations with the ways in which these social 
practices were carried out. When such ideation-practice linkages are forged and 
institutionalized, we can say that the idea of audience is fully legitimized. Three 
mechanisms of legitimation were involved: appropriation, incorporation and 
institutionalization, each of which characterizes a specific historical period in the 
development of such linkages. Before I move on to this historical analysis，it will be 
useful to review the development of the three types of surveys and their linkages with 
the fission of the audience concept in the US. That local (to us) history has been much 
better studied academically and the scholarly analysis of it can provide a firmer 
intellectual grounding to my analysis of the China case. 
Capitalist Democracy: Three Types of Surveys in the US 
The historical development of the three types of surveys in the United States clearly 
illustrates the dynamics between ideational change and social practices. Technical 
advances in modem social sciences no doubt were important. Such advances, while 
following the internal logic in the growth of scientific knowledge, coincided with the 
general social conditions of expansion of the national market and democracy in the US. 
The development of the three types of surveys established the supremacy of efficiency, 
standardization, and rationality based on modem science and contributed to the 
general trend of democratizing the American society started since the end of the 19^ 
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century. Along the way, it shaped the contemporary conceptions of consumers, public, 
and audience, which, together, form a constellation of ideas centered on the image of 
autonomous individuals complete with their rights and freedom to choose. 
Let us start with the idea of public opinion. Although the concept of public opinion is 
largely a product of the Enlightenment project in the century when the liberal and 
democratic political philosophies started to appear, its contemporary form did not 
become a consensual understanding or a common notion until the rise of the Gallup 
and Crossley polls in the 1930s in the United States (Price, 1992). Three major 
developments at that time formed the social conditions for the emergence of the 
polling enterprise. First, the development of the disciplinary techniques and bodies of 
knowledge, primarily those of sampling, measurement scales of attitude, and 
statistical analysis, all of which are key ingredients of the methodology for the opinion 
polls (P. Converse, 1987). Second, politically, the expansion of suffrage at the 
beginning of the 20'^  century institutionally legitimized the idea of “one person, one 
vote" and made such idea the cornerstone of today's concept of "public opinion" 
(Gingsberg, 1986; J. Converse, 1987). Third, the establishment of the hegemony of 
the scientific rationality, which elevated the importance of technical proficiency, 
standardization, precision and specialization, rendered to opinion polls the scientific 
aura (Herbst, 1993). In addition, with the institutional development of election 
campaigns, political candidates as well as journalists came to realize that it was very 
important to precisely gauge the needs and positions of a candidate，constituents 
before an election. All these constituted the fertile ground for the public opinion polls 
to grow into a major industry in the United States (Miller, 1994). 
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However, once the social practice of opinion polling made its debut, it soon gained its 
transformative power in the political arena. Herbst (1993) remarks that the opinion 
polling has shaped American politics by quantifying democracy and rationality while 
communicating authority and popularity in public debate. George Gallup, the father 
of modem opinion polling, had already lauded polling for advancing the democratic 
civilization. He argued, opinion polling promised a measure of civic renewal and 
strengthened democracy by giving ordinary citizens a greater say in public decision 
making (Robinson, 1997). However, other scholars point out, opinion polls are also 
harnessed to mobilize public consent and thus promote the state power (Ginsberg, 
1986). Some scholars also argue, the growing enterprise of opinion polling and its 
everyday practices in the past half century has indeed made a major contribution to the 
changing conceptions of public opinion. It redefined and secured the new idea of “one 
person, one vote" (Converse, 1987; Price, 1992). Bogart (1972) even argued, public 
opinion in today's sense really began with the advent of the polling technology, and “it 
is impossible for us to retreat to the meanings of public opinion as it was understood 
by Thomas Jefferson in the century, by Alexis de Tocqueville and Lord Bryce in 
the 19出，or even Walter Lippmann in 1922"(p.l4). 
While public opinion is basically a concept in the political sphere and opinion polling 
has long been an essential means in American politics, the idea of audience seems to 
be more market-oriented. Audience surveys played a key role in stabilizing such idea 
of audience. The whole enterprise of audience surveys could be seen as a response to 
the intense competition of the commercial media and the boom of broadcasting in the 
1930s (Beville, 1988). The survey data at that time, usually reported as “ratings” of 
the electronic media and "readership" or circulation of the print media, provided the 
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institutionalized knowledge base for the sale of advertising time and advertising page 
in the marketplace. It involved a complex accommodation among the commercial 
media, the advertisers and the members of audience. Even for the service-oriented 
public radio and public television, they also utilized the audience survey data to claim 
their legitimacy and ask for more financial resources from their institutional licensees 
and other grantors (Stavitsky, 1998). 
In addition, the survey results also became an important reference for content 
production and re-orientation. Audience then became reified into the figures coming 
from surveys. Audience size, exposure time, preferences, channel selections, and so 
on could all be measured, or objectified, by the sample surveys and other assessment 
techniques and they can then be infused into the social reality through the bargaining 
and transaction between media and advertisers (or the sponsors). Over the years, 
numerous methodological innovations and refinements have been made to construct 
the images of audience. Audiences have been segmented, redefined, and molded by 
the practices of audience surveys. Nowadays the common conception of audience is 
almost equated to "what audience survey tries to measure." 
Consumer surveys appeared as a response to the expansion and specialization of the 
American industry and the emergence of the revolutionary mass marketing (Wright-
Isak and Prensky, 1993; Tedlow, 1997). The key decade in the development of mass 
marketing and mass consumption was the 1880s when the sustained economic 
depression was over, the mid-century political conflicts had largely been resolved and 
a vast network of communication was in place. Numerous "power brands，’ were 
created at that time and the operational mode of enterprises was changed into mass 
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production. As a matter of fact, such democratization of consumption and the need for 
mass marketing were in the nature of capitalism (Schumpeter, 1991). With all these 
changes, manufacturers tried to develop marketing research to better rationalize their 
production planning while advertisers sought better survey techniques to know more 
about the mass consumers in the expanding national market. Corporate knowledge of 
the consumer became the scientific basis to segment market. These social needs and 
conditions fostered a positive environment for the coming of survey-based marketing 
research, primarily consumer surveys. With the development of statistics and measure 
techniques, consumer surveys took hold in the 1920s both in both American business 
and academic institutions. Central to the significance of consumer surveys is its 
commitment to the consumer concept. The real meaning of consumer to a large extent 
was defined and promoted by the continuously refined marketing survey practices in 
the following years. Defined as "buying public," consumers were also fractionalized 
based on age, sex, education, income, profession, all the categories constructed by 
modem social science and applied by marketing surveys, and then they were grouped 
and packaged as different targeted market segments. 
However, the significance of marketing research is not only to plumb consumer mind 
and thereby to facilitate the rationalization and efficiency for mass manufacturing 
system and the advertising business, it is also part of the American democratizing 
project since the end of century. It served as the technological and conceptual 
progenitor of the later fledgling practices of opinion polling as well as audience 
surveys. The sampling methods that the market analysis had built up furnished 
yardsticks by which opinion polling and audience surveys could be checked 
(Robinson, 1997). In this sense, the latter two kinds of surveys were developed 
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conceptually and methodologically largely as an adjunct or offshoot of marketing 
research. At the institutional level, marketing research agencies flourished in the 
1920s and incorporated and syndicated polling agencies in the 1930s. Audience 
survey got its legitimacy in academic bureaus in 1940s and during the World War II 
came into being a research branch of the federal government (Mills, 1969). After that, 
the three types of surveys each started their own business. 
This historical trajectory clearly shows that consumer market development was the 
driving engine in the development of the contemporary concepts of audience, public, 
and consumers. The consumer model becomes the basic epistemological framework 
in which the contemporary model of audience, as well as that of public, is developed. 
The centrality of consumer market has left a strong imprint in the concept of audience. 
Audience is an aggregate of individuals based on their demographic attributes; they 
develop their tastes, preferences, and behavioral patterns in consistence with their 
socio-demographic locations; they also enjoy the freedom of choice based on their 
individual needs. 
Rescuing the Political Authority: Three Types of Surveys in China 
Clearly, the China story is different. The applied survey enterprise in the US, as 
discussed above, was initiated in the market domain and then expanded to the political 
domain, in China it just happened in a reverse order. While marketing surveys are 
familiar and ubiquitous feature in today's China, when tracing their historical 
development, one quickly notes that they spouted first in audience surveys, which first 
appeared in early 1980s (Chen, 2000). Opinion polls also grew out of the early 
audience surveys. To a large degree, it is audience survey that not only prepared 
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methodology and operational experiences for the subsequent practices of opinion 
polls and marketing research, but also opened conceptual and ideological space for 
them as well. 
As to the precisely defined audience survey, it was surely not a practice in a market 
condition, as it was the case in the US, because when the first audience survey was 
conducted in China, there was no consumer market to speak of. Rather, it was started 
to serve China's media reform in the early 1980s, which was part of the political 
project to rescue the ruling Communist Party from the legitimacy crisis incurred 
during the Cultural Revolution. As a matter of fact, the early audience surveys were 
not meant to measure readership and program ratings for commercial benefits of 
media. Instead, they were designed to gauge propaganda effect while seeking 
respondents' opinions on how to modify media practices in order to salvage media 
credibility. Nevertheless, the early audience surveys became a democratizing agent 
for the coming social change that includes the proliferation of other kinds of surveys 
for political and marketing purposes. These different survey practices in turn elicited 
and solidified their corresponding ideas, namely audience, public and consumer, 
revealing the dynamics of ideational changes in reform China. 
Compared with what happened in the United States, we could easily conclude that the 
development of survey practices in China is certainly conditioned by a set of different 
social contexts. However, we should also note that the survey enterprise in China was 
developed with reference to American experiences and the Chinese practitioners even 
drew directly from American experiences to develop a similar statistical grasp of 
public thoughts and behaviors. If this is the case, then we should ask the following 
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questions: if as many liberal intellectuals and strategists insist, all scientific survey 
measurement of public attitudes contains the liberal ideas such as individual 
egalitarianism and autonomy, two basic premise of modem democracy, then why such 
alien surveys, alien in the sense both of survey practice itself and the ideology behind 
the practices, could be transplanted, developed and legitimized in China without a 
revolutionary change of the political system? Why after a short digesting process, 
even opinion polling, which was clearly in conflict with China's ruling ideology, 
could be finally absorbed into its political institutions? And what is the impact of such 
particular temporal trajectory of developing the three types of surveys on the 
development of the idea of audience in China's context? 
Two basic arguments may point to the answer. First of all, in their epistemology and 
functionalist orientation, the three types of survey are all administrative research in 
nature. Survey as a methodological tool does not contain any critical canon against 
any political system, despite it being a logical alliance with liberal democracy due to 
its individualist-oriented premises. Instead, it can be applied under all systems to help 
solving certain problems, either political or commercial. Borrowing Todd Gitlin 
(1978)'s analysis on “the dominant paradigm," the administrative-oriented survey is 
always designed and conducted from the standpoint of existing power and institution. 
It poses questions based on the primary concerns of some legitimized institutions and 
is funded and conducted by some legitimized institutions to improve or rationalize 
social control by those in power. Therefore, survey methodology and practice are not 
"capitalistic" in nature and could be incorporated into some alternative political 
system, including Communist China. 
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Secondly, there is a connection between such epistemological predisposition and the 
practical needs in China's specific context. Since China's political culture has a long 
tradition of pragmatism, the positivistic survey practices with strong social relevance 
could be adopted by China's authorities and serve the political and economic reform 
needs in different historical periods. This was certainly the case in the mid-1980s 
when reforms appeared to be the only way to rescue the Party from its legitimacy 
crisis. The reformists within the Party, while attempting to carry out various reform 
measures without challenging the basic tenet of the existing ideology, harnessed the 
opinion polls to combat the conservatives by presenting "people's voices." They 
appropriated the survey results and made them published on official newspapers to 
legitimize their policies. It is also in this sense that I characterize the idea on the 
subject of such opinion polling practices as semi-public, but not a fully fulfilled public. 
The people did not acquire complete sovereignty and genuine say on public issues and 
to some extent, they were exploited by the Party-state. 
Nevertheless, the social practices of surveys still played an instrumental role in 
legitimizing the ideas centered on audience. It is also a process by which the practices 
were themselves legitimized. In the following sections, I will use appropriation, 
incorporation and institutionalization as three theoretical characterizations of the 
mechanisms of such legitimizing process in China. Appropriation basically occurs in 
the discursive domain where the advocate community accommodates with the 
legitimate symbolic resources as a discursive strategy to justify their innovative 
practices, while incorporation takes place in the practical domain where the academic 
activities, the market forces and the state power are all intertwined, each contributing 
different practical resources to bring survey practices to its arena, turning surveys into 
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part of its constituting practices. Institutionalization is the process in which the new 
social practices are granted a degree of legitimacy through routinization, formalization 
and normalization of them over a period of time. Each of these three concepts 
captures the dominant features of a particular historical period and together they form 
a historical sequence in the legitimization of the three types of survey practices. The 
preparatory stage was dominated by appropriation, which was to open ideological as 
well as the ideational space for the alien survey practices to take root and be 
domesticated in China. Audience survey was started at this stage. Incorporation 
occurred mainly when the state absorbed the opinion survey research into its reform 
agenda and manipulated the survey results to engineer public consent in the mid-
1980s. Institutionalization became the key when, compelled by the market forces 
since the mid-1990s, survey research has expanded to the market domain and became 
one of the most profitable businesses in China. 
Appropriation 
While in the US, the term of "audience" appeared much earlier than modem audience 
surveys, in China almost immediately after its introduction in the early 1980s, the idea 
of audience was put to practice in a survey. The 1982 Beijing survey with a sample of 
2,629 city residents is widely regarded as the first large-scale audience survey ever 
conducted in China and it is now referred to as a milestone for the survey enterprise in 
China (Rogers, Zhao, Pan, & Chen，1985). Planned within the ideological framework 
of Marxism，this survey did contain key elements of modem audience survey normally 
found in the West, including probability sampling, a standardized questionnaire, and 
modem statistical analysis. 
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The project encountered fierce resistance from some of "the established intellectuals" 
who castigated the survey as "bourgeoisie opinion polling." To them, the concept of 
public ripped the class analysis inherent in the concept of "people." Connecting it to 
opinion represented an attempt toward bourgeoisie liberalization; together with other 
concepts of similar "bourgeois nature," such as freedom, individual rights and 
democracy, they would undermine the Party authorities. Further, they argued, random 
sampling and standardized questionnaire amounted to bypassing the Party leadership. 
Therefore, they claimed, survey methodology was a "pseudo-science freed from class 
analysis {chao-jieji de wei-kexue).” The resistance delayed the publication of the 
results for half a year. However, noticing the ideological overtone in surveys, the 
project became a widely reported indication of how far China had been changing 
(Chen, 1989; 1991). 
The event was historically significant. It was a critical marker of the rising influence 
of a particular alignment of liberal intellectuals, reform-minded officials and media 
professionals. They formed an emerging community of the reform discourse, shifting 
the balance of power configuration in both the political and discursive domains. In the 
ideological contestation for changes, they resort to strategic maneuvering by dressing 
audience surveys in the coat of Marxism and Maoism. This process, which I call 
appropriation, meaning, involves mobilizing the legitimate discursive recourses to 
maneuver through the ideological land mines and to weave new ideas into the old 
ideological fabric, thereby cultivating a conceptual space in which operational 
novelties and innovations can take root. 
The specifics of appropriation differed in parallel to the China's changing political 
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dynamics in different historical periods. In the initial stage of audience surveys, the 
advocates made an effort to find ideological justifications of such surveys in Mao's 
words. Most prominent among them is An Gang, then the director of the Journalism 
Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences a member of the 
Editing Committee of the official People's Daily. Rhetorically, An invoked Mao's 
statements on "mass line" (qunzhong luxian) and empirical investigation {shiji 
diaocha) as their symbolic resources to legitimize the new audience survey. 
According to An, Mao required Party's propaganda workers to study their readers 
through diaocha, or empirical investigation. The traditional techniques such as letters 
to editors and meetings with sample audience members were too limited as techniques 
for "studying the readers." Audience survey was an improved technique that could 
systematically and scientifically “seek for truth from facts," which in turn was an 
important measure to "continue the tradition of the Party press" (An, 1986; Chen, 
1991). An made his arguments in two widely cited articles, entitled "Study our 
Readers" (1981) and "We Must Have a Serious Attitude toward Surveys of the Media 
Audience" (1984) r e s p e c t i v e l y ^ The following passage from the second article 
exemplifies the rhetorical strategy that An used in formulating his arguments. 
We communists consider empirical investigations our primary method to 
understand and transform the world. Before his death, Mao Zedong often 
taught us to "look into the society." The basic Marxist and Lenist work 
style is to advocate that people carry out systematic and thorough 
research about the objective world, making plans in accordance with the 
practical world and seeking truth from the facts…The Chinese media 
have all along carried on a fine tradition of hearing opinions and 
suggestion, through various channels, from the audience, and of finding 
out their wishes and requests, so as to improve their work. This is the 
very first time in Chinese journalistic history that comprehensive survey 
research about an area's media audience has been conducted with 
scientific methodology and modem statistics. This is a breakthrough for 
26 An's 1981 article was published on Journalism Front, August, 1981. The 1983 one was published in 
Chinese Journalism Yearbook 1983. 
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the Chinese journalism, and it may well be a new experience for the 
veterans who have worked decades in the field." 
In response to attacks from the conservatives that quantification meant departing from 
the class analysis, An offered his defense in terms of Mao's argument on the 
dialectical relations between quantity and quality: 
The advantage of such a social-statistical analysis is that it strictly 
follows the rule of random sampling to determine the research subject… 
Everyone knows that sufficient quantitative changes would result in 
qualitative change. In the process of understanding the target audience, 
one needs to develop a grasp of numbers, perceiving regularities in 
numerical changes and discovering the qualitative patterns. Studying the 
media public using social-statistical analysis enables one to do 
quantitative analysis about the audience needs, interests, and attitudes in 
terms of numbers and regularity from the numbers.... All of the above 
corresponds to Mao Zedong's advice to ‘start with existing conditions, 
and then use their regularities as the guidelines of our actions. 
The initiation of audience surveys was therefore an innovative measure to “enhance 
the tradition of the Party press." Whether the advocates of audience surveys realized 
or not, the discursive maneuvering was strategic toward legitimizing their practice. 
One historical anecdote supports this interpretation. When the Institute of Journalism 
Research at the CASS was in the midst of carrying out the Beijing audience survey, its 
office received a call from a high level official in the Party's Propaganda Ministry. 
The official demanded to know whether the Institute was conducting "public opinion 
polling，，{minyi diaocha), still a taboo in China. Clearly sensing the ideological 
danger, the Institute's officials responded by stressing that it was only an audience 
survey designed to "investigate newspaper readers, radio listeners, and TV viewers, in 
order to better understand the audience and to make the propaganda more effective" 
(Chen, 1989). They brought in Karl Marx, who designed the Universal Labor 
Statistical Program as early as 1866 and his celebrated work The Capital was a fine 
example of his application of statistical method to analyze society (An, 1986). 
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The discursive maneuvering made it possible to avoid regression and rendered 
audience surveys appropriatiness within the old ideological framework. However, 
this is not to say that the words of Mao and Marx were the only symbolic resource for 
appropriating the survey practice. Nor does it imply that the appropriation process 
only occurred in this initial period. When "reform" became the most powerful and 
legitimate word in the mid-1980s, the advocates started to venture into public opinion 
surveys under the cover of the "reform" discourse. In the second phase of 
appropriation, the reform-wing of the Party, most notably Zhao Ziyang, then the 
General secretary of the Party, became the energetic supporters of policy surveys. 
They stressed the instrumental values of surveys in pursuing their reform agenda. 
Zhao even made a speech at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987 emphasizing the 
need for public opinion to play a "supervisory role" in China's reforms. It was the first 
time that survey was officially recognized in a Party congress document, making 
survey practices a major issue in the following years (Rosen, 1989). Institutionally, 
Zhao Ziyang's think tank set up the Chinese Economic System Reform Research 
Institute (CESRRI) to conduct a series of large-scale national surveys, investigating 
the actual situation of urban economic reforms, the public responses to price reform, 
the functions of government and the prospects for streamlining government, and so 
forth. 
Despite such support from the Party authority, the advocates tried to de-ideologize 
surveys for political uses, defining surveys as a mere fact-finding instrument. Wu 
Jinglian, a senior reform economist, Chen Yizi, the head of CESRRI, and other 
reform-minded establishment intellectuals all made effort to stress the methodological 
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advantages of surveys while rejecting their ideological implication. Survey practices 
so situated became a means for the reform-oriented officials to promote and legitimize 
their reform program in the political struggle with the Party's conservatives. For 
example, to justify the decision to put off the price reform, Zhao Ziyang argued in an 
interview with Milton Friedman on January 25, 1989 that it was because the public 
was still "psychologically... unable to endure such changes" in an inflationary 
environment (Rosen, 1989). By legitimizing the mass opinions as an arbiter on reform 
policies, the reformers' project won the support of large segments of the authoritarian 
society. As a result, the ideas and related practices of conducting these surveys were 
undermining the very basis of the communist ideology. Polling inevitably brought 
with it the associated ideas of individual rights, democracy, freedom of expression and 
so on. Partly due to such ideological overtones, with fall of Zhao following the 
crackdown of the student uprising in 1989, opinion surveys lost their legitimacy and 
were cleared from the political domain. 
When “market，，gained its currency in the reform discourse after 1992, surveys 
flourished. By the end of 1998, there were more than 870 survey and market research 
entities all over the country. The Central Viewer Survey and Consulting Center 
(CVSC), grown out of a small audience research team within CCTV in 1986，now 
became the largest market research company. Joint ventured with Taylor Nelson 
Sofres Group, CVSC not only operates the world's largest TV audience measurement 
panel, covering 18,100 homes in 105 cities and regions across China and measuring 
over 700 channels all day, but also expands its business to marketing research, 
advertisement monitoring analysis and consulting business. 
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In this third phase of appropriation, the survey practices were legitimized primarily by 
the discourse of market. Market discourse became an effective means to talk about 
media commercialization within the commandist media system. However, we should 
recognize that this tendency rests more with media's financial management than 
content production. It is also the case more among media practitioners than Party 
officials. In media's financial management, audience surveys, especially program 
ratings and newspaper and magazine circulations, are sponsored, advocated and used 
by advertisers, advertising agencies, and the media outlets that survive on advertising 
dollars. Such surveys are a market necessity, providing a more scientific measure of 
the audience's market values for the transaction between the media and the advertisers. 
In this process, audience is reformulated in the conception of consumers. In a special 
issue of the trade magazine entitled Chinese Journalist in 1999，many chief editors, 
most of whom are from Party organ newspapers, wrote about the significance of the 
idea of audience as consumers. They stated, "audience is consumer and the 
requirement of the audience should be satisfied unconditionally;" "everything could 
be changed except serving the audience;" "audience must come first;" and “to foster 
and develop the audience market is essential in media management. 
Paradoxically, such market-based discourse remains timid and ambiguous in the area 
of content production. In this field, obviously, much more have been done than said. 
The media practitioners set the audience as the new legitimate basis for newsgathering 
and reportingnot so much in open discussions, but in everyday practices. They 
invent, experiment and justify their non-routine or improvised journalistic activities 
with an extreme care to avoid stepping on any ideological land mines (Pan, 
27 See Modern Newspaper Sales, the supplement to Chinese Journalist, 1998. 
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forthcoming). When they do talk about content production, they stick to the 
propaganda function of the media. In the mean time, they use some ambiguous terms 
such as "getting closer to the audience" and "serving for the masses" to legitimize 
producing the media content with broader market appeals. Audience surveys are often 
used to promote a new program, or publish more “what the masses would enjoy.” At 
the same time, they carefully manage their discourse to avoid being branded as being 
driven by the market, equivalent to diverging from propagating the Party's policies 
and ideology. Such feature in the discursive practices clearly shows the limit of 
market serving as a source of legitimacy as well as a basic tension in China's media 
reforms. 
This historical trajectory of appropriating audience surveys in China reflects China's 
political vicissitudes, where the symbolic resources necessary to justify and organize 
social practices have been changing over the years. Despite the recognizable changes, 
two points are clearly shown. One is that although ideational change is first 
manifested in the changing discourse, such change needs to be congealed in the 
corresponding changes in social practices. Derailing Zhao's political reform program 
after 1989 clearly interrupted the emergence of opinion polling and inhibited any 
further growth of public with the right to know and to participate. The other point is 
that a new idea and its prescribed practices must be appropriated into the prevailing 
discourse with the legitimate symbolic resources. Carefully managing the discourse 
helps the agents of social change to go through the ideological mine field. Ideational 
change is changing discourse and it is also realized through appropriate discourse. 
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Incorporation 
Different from market as the driving force in developing audience surveys in the US, 
the first audience survey in China was primarily an academic endeavor. It did not 
directly benefit any specific media organization, although a couple of newspapers 
including the official People ’s Daily were involved. Audience surveys came to serve 
specific media outlets' commercial interests only after the late 1980s when media 
reform pushed media to the market and advertising industry started to develop. Still, 
the first Beijing survey inspired the other audience surveys, which prepared 
accumulated knowledge, skills, and personnel for the development of the survey-
based industry. 
However, the immediate significance of the Beijing survey was in legitimizing similar 
surveys to be carried out under the direction of Party authorities at various levels. 
Such surveys were conducted in Zhejiang (1983)，Jiangsu (1983)，Shanghai (1985), 
and Xinjiang (1987). All of them were conducted by journalism research institutes 
under the auspices of the local media and with clear authorization of the appropriate 
Party authorities. The local authorities now assumed the role of a supporter as well as 
a supervisor. These cases show that the Party soon learned to utilize the new 
"scientific" methodology to serve its own purpose. The authorites recognized the 
ideological functions of the survey research~ gauging public sentiment and shaping 
and molding public opinions to support its reform agenda (Rosen, 1989; Zhu, 1988). 
The point is clearly shown by the shared features of these surveys. The sampling 
frames of those surveys were always the whole population above 13 in the survey site 
rather than the audience or potential audience of a specific medium. The key 
questions asked were mainly on media credibility, propaganda efficiency, and ways to 
8 8 
improve media propaganda. These surveys served more for official policymaking 
purposes than for academic purposes of understanding audience, let alone for 
commercial purposes. These surveys thus as precedents in the mode of operation 
(collaboration between academics and officials) and in content (asking policy-related 
questions) for the subsequent practices of opinion polling and for surveys to be 
absorbed into the established political system. This is a process that I characterize as 
incorporation. 
Incorporation takes place in two ways, control and utilization. Control involves the 
Party using its and government's administrative power to regulate, both openly and 
tacitly, the operations of the surveys. Utilization involves the Party exploits the 
academic and market resources in conducting surveys for its political uses. Through 
these two ways, the Party-led system absorbs the survey practices into its institutional 
framework. 
Control may take many forms. Three are clearly discernible, privileging, disciplining 
and punishing. Privileging refers to the process of stratifying the publication venues 
and certificating some as more legitimate venues to publish survey results. This is an 
implicit yet tacit political control over the survey practices. At the beginning of the 
survey practices, only some of the official newspapers and trade journals were 
privileged to publish the survey outcomes. As a result, while the official media status 
helped to legitimize survey research, the different publication venues also implied the 
hierarchy of degrees of legitimacy. By setting an example on how to represent survey 
results, People's Daily and other authoritative newspapers and journals defined the 
way in which survey results must be presented in accordance to the Party's agenda. 
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By doing so, they also restricted the possibilities of what topics to explore, what 
questions to ask, how to frame survey questions, and so on. For example, the report of 
the Beijing survey in 1982 was first published in People，s Daily on January 30，1983 
(Chen, 2000) before other media outlets picked it up. The presentation by People's 
Daily served as a model to be mimicked by other media outlets. Later on, some other 
opinion surveys were also published on the People ’s Daily. The most authoritative 
official newspaper served providing exemplars for how the kinds of surveys could be 
done legitimately. These were surveys focusing on Party's policy agenda and public's 
support for the reform policies promoted by the Party. To some extent, they played an 
exemplary role for the subsequent surveys to follow the policy-oriented tradition (Zhu, 
1988). Privileging is thus a hegemonic mechanism; it sets up paradigmatic exemplars 
for other pollsters to internalize the implicit rules on conducting surveys and to carry 
out self-censorship in developing surveys. 
The second form of control is disciplining, meaning, explicitly establishing formal 
regulations and licensing rules to govern the survey practices. For example, in August 
1999，sensing the ideological danger for the local survey companies to increasingly 
corporate with foreign institutions, the state issued a regulation on "social surveys 
involving foreign agencies." It requires any survey organization conducting foreign-
sponsored surveys to obtain a special license and to submit the questionnaire and 
implementation plan to three state organsthe state statistical bureau, the national 
confidentiality bureau and the public security bureau—for examination and approval. 
Before that, various Party and government authorities issued executive directives— 
many were not in written form but in verbal instructions~to restrict how surveys 
could be conducted. For example, no data related to "state secrets" should be made 
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public; surveys should not be used as a tool to solicit anti-Party opinions; no 
collaborating surveys with foreign agencies, and so on. 
The third control mechanism involves punishing those who violated the rules of game 
set by the authorities. It is a formal censorship. The extreme case of punishment is the 
political repression in 1989，when the state blacklisted seven prominent intellectuals 
and called for their arrest. Those on the list included Chen Yizi, the head of CESRRI, 
Chen Ziming, the head of the private Beijing Social and Economic Research Center, 
and Wang Junta。，a close associate of Chen Ziming, all of whom advocated the liberal 
ideas of democracy and promoted the political practices of public opinion polling 
(Rosen, 1989). After 1992 while the survey business flourished in the market, it has 
never been given reins for its free development. The ideological control is still there 
and the punishment is now in various forms of verbal warning, imposing fines, 
revoking business license, or even criminal prosecution. In an interview with Victor 
Yuan, the owner of Horizen, the best-known private marketing research firm which 
was formed in 1992, he said that when he released a report in 1998 that most Chinese 
was expecting a change soon in the longtime one-child policy, he got an irate warning 
call from an official of the state Family Planning Commission. Clearly, polls on some 
social issues could still come into conflict with the political system. To avoid 
"troubles" and punishment, as Yuan said, the pollsters got a well-trained sense on 
"what the system will allow" and “what not to do." 
If privileging, disciplining and punishing constitute the bureaucratic control to set 
boundaries of survey operations, the other form of incorporation involves the Party-
state authority exploiting both of the academic resources and the market forces for its 
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own political purpose. The first strategy of incorporation involves the Party utilizing 
the academic resources to improve its political communication and empower their 
new political management. In the middle of 1980s before the market-based survey 
entities sprang up, it was the academic institutions, mainly the Journalism Institute of 
China Social Science Academy, the Public Opinion Research Institute (affiliated to the 
People's University of China), and the Chinese Social Survey Institute (founded by 
the State Economic System Reform Commission), that were commissioned by the 
state or Party agencies as well as the official media outlets to conduct surveys. As a 
matter of fact, those academic institutes all thrived on official projects to a great extent 
and became integral components of the infrastructure for the reform program (Yu, 
1996). The widely publicized surveys in this period include the first nationwide 
sample survey of TV viewers in 1987, the survey of Beijing celebrities on the prospect 
of the coming year of dragon in 1988, and in the same year the survey of the 
representatives of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference on their attitudes towards journalism reform. A typical 
Party-state commissioned survey was the project on the "News Media and the 
Modernization in China" in 1987 (Chen, 2000). It was initiated by the Propaganda 
Ministry and the Chinese Social Survey Institute and later conducted by researchers 
from several higher education institutions and research institutes. The project 
investigated communication and development of individual modernity, as well as 
public's attitudes towards the Party's reform policies. The most notable thing is that 
the project was listed in the seventh Five-Year Plan as a key project in the academic 
field of philosophy and sociology. This status clearly demonstrates how the state 
incorporated the power of academic research into its political management. 
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Clearly, after the initial resistance, in mid 1980s, the state started to incorporate the 
emerging survey practices in line with its reform agenda. Such incorporation 
functions in two ways. First, surveys were used to gauge and crystallize the public 
sentiment. As Rosen (1989) and other western scholars observe, opinion surveys in 
reform-oriented communist governments such as in China could provide practical 
information for decision-makers, ascertain citizen reactions to specific reform policies, 
provide information about the degree of mass consciousness, help participants through 
opinion surveys strengthen their civic sense and interest in social affairs, and measure 
the achievement of reform goals and the agreement of such goals with social needs. 
Second, survey results were used for political manipulation under the academic cover. 
While carrying the aura of “scientificness，，, surveys can only generate "facts" that are 
as ideologically neutral and empirically valid as survey designers. Survey results were 
an important means for the reform wing of the Party to combat the Party conservatives. 
More importantly, survey results were also "borrowed" and even tampered by the 
reformists to engineer and mold public consent, thereby mobilize the public to play its 
designated role of voicing support of Party policies in the political process. By 
publishing appropriated "scientific" results on official newspapers, surveys that 
produced unfavorable results were discarded and those who carried out such surveys 
were marginalized, while those who conducted surveys in support of the Party policies 
and followed the Party agenda were legitimized as mainstreams. As Rosen (1989) has 
noted, survey results disseminated by the People's Daily were always severely 
truncated to show the widespread "support" for a given policy. 
Such political manipulation has changed little even after 1992 when the marketization 
of political management has progressively de-politicized the state, economics and 
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culture (Chen and Lee, 1998). Academic surveys are still under the tight control of the 
Party and most of them remain to be harnessed for political propaganda. If there is 
something different now, it is that some academic institutes are licensed to receiving 
funding for survey projects from the overseas, for example, from the UNESCO, the 
Ford Foundations and other foreign universities. Two things should be noted here. 
First, the foreign sponsors are carefully selected. When BBC approached the 
Journalism Institute of the CSSA for collaboration on a project, it was turned down for 
some "ideological considerations."^^ Compared with BBC, the UNESCO and other 
non-government international organizations seem to be “ideologically safer" and 
therefore they are more acceptable. Second, the state also functions as a channel to 
fiinnel external resources to those agencies that have been incorporated into the 
Party's propaganda mechanism. For example, before the World Conference on 
Women held in Beijing in 1995, the state received funding from the UNESCO and 
allocated it to the Journalism Research Institute of the CASS for a "propaganda task" 
of surveying Chinese journalists. The institute conducted a nationwide survey of 
5,800 journalists in order to provide a "positive" profile of Chinese women journalists 
(Chen, et. 1998). 
The second strategy of incorporation involves the state drawing resources from the 
market to conduct polls for political uses. This has been particularly the case 
especially since 1992, when the number of private marketing research entities grew 
dramatically. At the end of 1998，private marketing research companies accounted for 
65% of the survey industry in China, while the remaining 30%, 4% and 1% were 
respectively the state-owned statistical departments and media-operated survey 
28 From the interview with Sun Xunpei, then the Director of the Journalism Institute of Chinese 
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groups, the academic survey institutes, and foreign marketing research companies 
respectively.^^ While the private survey research firms are in some ways discomfort to 
the government, the government also seeks for help from the selected private 
companies to conduct some policy surveys. Now government contracts account for 
about 20 % ofHorizen's work.^ ° These surveys were conducted on issues such as the 
lifestyle and habits of the China's new entrepreneurial class, residents' sense of public 
security and their attitudes toward the police, urban tolerance to inflation, floating 
agricultural labor force, attitudes of the expatriates towards the officials overseeing 
them, and so on. 
Then the question is, why would the authorities turn to the private companies for such 
politically sensitive surveys, while the state has massive survey teams in the statistics 
departments at all administrative levels and other state-owned survey units? An 
obvious answer is that the Party does not think it will get straight answers with the 
survey services within the state apparatus, since these people have long been trained to 
provide information that would confirm the official expectations. But a more 
plausible explanation is that since conducting an opinion survey needs a large mount 
of money, the officials just want to "make the borrowed hen to lay eggs.,，Delicately, 
they tax selected private marketing research companies and the latter receive the 
prestige as a form of symbolic capital from working on government-commissioned 
projects. A good illustration is still from Horizon. Although Horizon has several 
regular state clients (mainly the Department of Labor, Department of Education and 
Department of Civil Administration) and their projects account 20% of all the 
Academy of Social Sciences. 
29 The statistical data was from the lecture given by Victor Yuan on October 1999, the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong. 
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Horizon's work, Horizon has never made any profit directly from these clients or 
commissioned projects so far. A large part of Horizon's revenue is earned from their 
foreign giant clients, including major Euro-American transnational corporations, such 
as Ericssion, Coca-Cola, Motorola, Siemens, Amoco and so on. In addition, Horizon 
also gets funding for commissioned projects from non-profit international agencies, 
such as the Ford Foundations, UNICEF, and the World Bank. Foreign funding 
constituted 65% of Horizon's US$0.4 million profit on revenue of 1.5 million in 1998. 
The other 35% were from some large-scale domestic enterprises.^^ 
Because of the values as symbolic capital, state-commissioned projects then became 
another means for the state to incorporate survey research and for private companies to 
gain market advantages. The state acquiesces or even creates some institutional space 
for companies such as Horizon to operate. It licenses, offers protection, and even acts 
as a go-between to scramble business opportunities for such private companies. As 
for Horizon, by running omnibus surveys, basically adding questions to a larger 
commercial survey project sponsored by a foreign or local enterprise, it skillfully kills 
two birds with one stone. It almost pays nothing extra for their polling work for some 
state agencies. Indeed, an official link of this kind is indispensable for private survey 
entities to operate in today's Chinese society, where favoritism and cronyism are the 
dominant modes of business operation. The government agencies with well-
cultivated relationships constitute an important part of what Pan (1997b) calls "the 
web of subsidies" for the survey companies. By exploring this particular function of 
social network, the survey companies are able to reduce the cost of surveys. 
30 See Matt Forney's feature report, "Private pollster in China informs a touchy regime," Asian Wall 
Street Journal’ March 23, 1999. 
31 All the data and materials are from my interview with Victor Yuan on October 1999. 
96 
Such relationship reveals an intriguing hint on how the state borrows the market 
entities to produce new form political management in the process of the increasing 
marketization. It also reveals how the survey entities take advantage of both the state 
symbolic resources and the market material resources to develop their own survey 
business. 
The case of the Public Opinion Research Institute (FORI) at People's University also 
illustrates such symbiotic relationship between the market and the state. As the first 
academic survey institute founded as early as October 1986, the development of FORI 
reveals a changing triangular relationship among the academia, the market and the 
state. Before 1989, the government funded all the survey projects of FORI. However, 
after 1992, more than 90% of the funds are from the market while the institute still 
conducts respectable opinion polls for the government (Yu, 1996b). It has also been 
highly commercialized. They take in many marketing research projects from large-
scaled corporations as well as a good many audience surveys from various media 
outlets, including the Party organs such as the People，s Daily and Workers Daily, and 
the mass-appeal newspapers such as Beijing Youth Daily and Shopping Guide. Such 
plurality of financial sources suggests that on the one hand, this past non-profit survey 
institute has been transformed into a lucrative commercial entity, and on the other, the 
academic institution now serves two masters, the market and the state, for the joint 
benefits that serving either one of them would not produce. Funds for pure academic 
survey research are still very limited. As a result, this so-called academic research unit 
is only a byproduct of the marketing research and the opinion polls for the state. 
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Media, now surviving primarily in the market, also play a part in incorporating survey 
practices. They make great efforts to transform surveys into a new tool for generating 
news and a new genre of news presentation. After 1992，while the official organs were 
still commanded to publish survey results to serve the Party's political purpose, 
mass-appeal newspapers started to attract audience by translating some surveys into a 
new source for news, presenting statistics and different figures from survey results. 
This kind of news has been called "precision news" (jingque xinwen). The idea and 
the name obviously were borrowed from the west. Seeing the appeal to audiences, 
some major newspapers and major television networks started their own polling 
operations. Beijng Youth Daily and Chinese Youth Daily were among the first to create 
full-page section to publish these “social surveys" periodically in 1995. Carefully 
avoiding ideological land mines, most of these surveys are on non-political issues. 
For example, there was a poll asking high school seniors what kind of universities they 
would apply and why they chose those universities. Another poll asked the audience 
to rate the top restaurants and city buildings in Beijing. Beijing Youth Daily even 
encouraged the readers to propose survey topics. Some newspapers also publish 
consumer survey results periodically. Most prominent case is Shopping Guide 
(jingpin gouwu zhinan, published in Beijing), a newly emerged mass-appeal 
newspaper aimed at selling the middle-class lifestyle. To a large extent, these survey 
pages are not so much to create a public sphere for rational public discussions as to 
provide a new form of "news" on various aspects of the consumer culture. In this 




In the craze of media marketization started in 1992, audience surveys became more 
and more attractive to media organizations. At the same time, marketing research 
business, after brewing and lurking for a long time, started to expand its enterprise at a 
striking speed. Two significant changes in the political-economic environment of 
media operations in China contributed greatly to the development of audience surveys. 
The first is the reduction and gradual termination of state subsidies to almost all media 
organizations except a handful of chief Party-press, a process started in mid 1980s. In 
1992，the Press and Publication Administration under the State Council announced 
that all the newspapers must achieve financial self-reliance by the end of 1994. On the 
Ninth People's Congress in 1998, television stations were also required to stand on 
their own feet financially within the next three years. This means that media 
organizations have to turn to their audience for financial survival. 
Secondly, the resurrection and rapid expansion of the advertising industry provide 
further imperatives for media outlets to commodify their audience. Although media 
advertising started as early as 1979, the meagemess of its development did not change 
the revenue base and the structure of media financing until the media were thrown into 
the market in the 1990s. Now getting more advertisement is the cardinal institutional 
incentive for the media to know their program ratings and newspaper circulations. 
According to Chen and Lee (1998), while the newspaper circulation increased 10 
times from 1986 to 1996, their advertising revenues increased by 31 times over the 
decade. In 1997，the advertising revenues totaled RMB968.265 billion y u a n ? 
Advertising is even more important for television and the market competition among 
them has been fierce. The competition was more intensified especially after 1994 
32 Source: Modern Advertising, No.3, 1999. 
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when provincial television stations were granted permission to be uplinked to satellite 
(shang Xing) to expand their market coverage and therefore get more advertisement. 
The advertising price of Zhejiang TV increased 70%-80% after it started to be 
uploaded in 1994. Shandong TV's advertising revenue reached 0.34 billion in 1997， 
seven times of that of 1994 (Liu, 2000). The significance of the satellite uplinking is 
that it broke the CCTV monopoly of the national television market. It also 
substantially eroded the significance of administrative division as a determinant of the 
market partition. This changed reconfigured not only the market space but also the 
institutional space. To attract more audience in the national marketplace is now the 
new credo for competitions among TV stations, including both CCTV and provincial 
stations. Audience surveys therefore become part of the routines in media operation 
and ratings an institutionalized currency for media to bargain with advertisers and 
advertising agencies. 
The institutionalization of audience surveys is significant in two ways. First, social 
practices, once inspired by a new ideation, may help institutionalize the new ideation, 
if such social practices are congealed into the stable institutional arrangement. For the 
new idea of audience, therefore, survey activities may play such legitimating role and 
the idea thus becomes part of the everyday media operation together with the 
routinization of audience surveys. Second, the emergence of surveys as an industry 
may facilitate the new idea of audience to rid the long shadow of the commandist 
ideology. As Piotr Sztompka (1993) defines, institutionalization is more than the 
mere patterning which involves repetition or regularity of social practices; rather, it 
refers to the granting of a degree of legitimacy, a widespread acceptance or even 
positive sanctioning to the innovative idea as well as the evasive practices. This is a 
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complex process, where not only both of the idea and its related practices need to be 
institutionalized but more importantly, ideational institutionalization is to be achieved 
with the institutionalized practices. Stable access to resources, communication 
networks, established organizations, autonomy and control over processes of 
evaluation and debate are all important features of such practice institutionalization. 
Three sub-processes of such institutionalization can be identified, namely 
formalization, routinization and normalization. 
Formalization 
Formalization refers to the process in which audience survey activities are absorbed or 
embodied into the formal structural arrangement both within and without media 
organizations. Within organizations, a large number of media outlets, including the 
chief Party organs, People's Daily and Chinese Central Radio Broadcasting, 
restructured their “Mass Work Department {qunzhong gongzuo buy by either 
changing it into "Audience Research Department" or adding a section on audience 
research within the original department (Song, 1998). CCTV even expanded its 
audience research team into the Central Viewer Survey & Consulting Center, a formal 
media and marketing research company now possessing the country's largest media 
research network^l In addition to the traditional work of dealing with letters from the 
audience, such audience research units now collaborate with other survey companies 
to employ various techniques, such as surveys, focus group, diary panels, people 
meters and other readership measurement, to ascertain the tastes and preferences of 
the audience. Their research work is becoming not only an important basis for other 
departments to make decisions in content production, program scheduling, or page 
33 CVSC was "unhooked" from CCTV in June 1995, and it became an independent survey company 
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layout design, but also a standard for the transaction between media and advertisers 
(Pan, 2000; Liu, 2000). 
Outside media organizations, audience research activities are also formalized into 
institutional arrangement. In 1991, under the auspices of the Ministry of Radio and 
Television, the Chinese Association of Audience Research was formed (Chen, 1991). 
The most conspicuous indication of the formalization is the emergence of the survey 
research industry. Today, there are more than 870 survey or marketing research 
entities operating in the country, most of which are in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou, the three largest media and advertising markets in China. A clear 
indication of the emergence of the industry is the establishment of the Preparatory 
Committee for the Chinese Association of Marketing Research in 1998. The 
participating members of this trade organization include 25 most influential survey 
research companies. Clearly, not all these research entities and their activities are 
related to narrowly defined audience research. However, they share the origin of the 
1982 Beijing audience survey and they are clearly contributing to determining the 
market values and market segmentation of audience. 
Routinization 
The second component of the institutionalization is the routinization of the practices 
of gathering quantitative data on audiences and systematizing and incorporating such 
information into routine activities of media production. Audience surveys are now 
routinely carried out by large media organizations for their strategic decision making. 
Most of the audience research departments within media organizations have specific 
from then on. 
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internal publications and they are required to give out survey reports at least once a 
month. The survey results are also presented at the regular editors' meetings. 
If "audience-centered" view of mass media communication was mostly a scholarly 
proposition in 1993 (see Ming, 1998), six years later, it has become the dominant 
framework for media managers. We can see this from the experiences of one highly 
successful newspaper, Chinese Computing (Zhongguo Jisuanji Bao). The paper was 
founded in 1995 and by 1998, its circulation had reached 200 thousands in the country 
with 120 pages per issue and an advertising revenue of nearly 160 million yuan. Its 
publisher explains that the paper's central strategy is to keep services to its readers on 
top of the paper's priority. Identifying its target readers and producing the content that 
would attract the desired readers are the starting point of the newspaper management. 
Toward this end, every year, the paper conducts surveys on readers, asking questions 
on their income, satisfaction with the paper, expectations of the paper, effectiveness of 
the paper's commercials, and so on. Further, the paper emphasizes on providing to its 
advertisers "effective readership," i.e., the readers that fit the profile of the target 
market of the advertisers. It even devised a system to detect the growth of the Chinese 
computing market and based on the size of the market to determine the desired 
circulation goal (Li, 1998，pp. 88-90). Similarly, CCTV has sponsored periodical 
nationwide audience surveys since 1987 and routinized the practice of reviewing 
ratings statistics to assess the fate of a program and to improve a program. In essence, 
routinizing the audience-centered practices indicates a changing basis for legitimacy 
of journalism and media content production. If consistency with the Party's ideology 
was the sole basis of legitimacy of all media contents, now, audiences' satisfaction 
becomes at least a supplementary if not alternative basis. The results of the 1997 
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survey of Chinese journalists support this argument. It was reported that "audience 
survey results" now became a new basis of legitimacy for journalists to evaluate news 
value. Traditionally, "professional training，，and "demonstration of news writings by 
the People's Daily and Xinhua Agency，，are two bases for the socialization of the 
journalists. As a matter of fact, the two Party organs had long been the only models 
for news value judgement. Now the three bases have constructed new criteria for 
media content production and evaluation, which in fact reflect the reality model of the 
complicated relationship among the professional-orientation, audience-centered 
orientation, and administrative-orientation in journalistic work (Yu, 1998). 
Normalization 
The third component of the institutionalization of audience is through normalization 
of the relationships among media outlets, advertisers/advertising agencies, and 
audiences. Starting in 1992, "establishing a socialist market economy" was an official 
economic reform program. In rapid marketization, fierce competition and resurgence 
of international advertising agencies in the Chinese market are making it highly 
inefficient to rely on personal networks and trading of favors in advertising production, 
as it was the case before 1992. The rapidly expanding advertising industry demanded 
authoritative readership survey and program rating data to function as the common 
currency for the transaction between media outlets and advertisers. Audience surveys 
are thus quickly becoming a means to normalize the relationship among media outlets, 
advertisers/advertising agencies, and audiences. With this change, audience are no 
longer simply subjects of ideological propaganda and recipients of Party's political 
mobilization. Rather, they are also commodities that media identify, classify, 
standardize and then sell to the advertisers. It was under this condition, the Central 
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Viewer Survey and Consulting Center (CVSC), first established in CCTV to know its 
viewers in the Party propaganda tradition, now becomes the largest market research 
company in China specializing in program ratings. It not only conducts the largest 
regular readership surveys with a sample of 71,500 in 30 cities, providing readership 
data for over 850 newspapers and magazines, but also conducts the largest TV 
audience measurement panel in the world, covering over 500 channels, with total 
sample size of 12,000 households in 63 cities, providing daily program and channel 
ratings data. 
A new observation should also be noticed. With the increasing marketization, 
audience surveys, especially program ratings, are used as a yardstick to normalize not 
only the transaction between media and advertisers, but also the relationship between 
media and other producers. Nowadays, many of the independent producers are 
required to sign an agreement with the media to promise delivering sufficient ratings 
with their program. Ju Xing Company, the producer of the TV series Secret Trips of 
Kangxi Emperor, is now asked to compensate Shanghai TV, since the program 
achieved a rating of 21.2% in Shanghai, 0.8% less than the promised rating stipulated 
in the contract the company signed with Shanghai T V , 
In addition, audience is no longer conceived as a homogeneous entity as it is implied 
in the concept of "masses." Rather, when talking about media management strategies, 
media managers talk about the heterogeneity and fluidity of audience. Audience is no 
longer an aggregate of individuals with a natural existence. Rather, it requires active 
cultivation by the media. To put this bluntly, audience needs to be manufactured 
From the news on http://www.sina.com.cn. June 4，2000. 
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through media operations. Further, the geographic distribution of audience is no 
longer a natural demographic fact. Rather, as several media managers articulate, 
media must take strategic measures to create desirable audience distribution patterns, 
including the degree of geographic concentration and the detailed segmentation 
according to demographics, interests and consumer patterns, that would bring the 
highest financial returns (Li and Luo, 1998; M. Li, 1998; Ma and Hu, 1998). Clearly, 
audience surveys serve the needs for institutionalized interactions between media 
outlets and advertisers. They are also means to create the institutional role of audience 
not only as consumers of media products and the products of the advertisers who 
advertise on the media but also as commodities to be packaged and sold to advertisers. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Through all these developments, an institutional arrangement is developed with 
audience clearly located. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of the institutional 
arrangements of the Maoist Party-press system (la) and the present market-based 
Party-press system (lb). In the Maoist Party-press system, both media and "masses" 
that the media served were confined within the Party-state sphere. In this sphere, we 
find no audience but masses who were dominated and led by the Party both through 
and within the media. The introduction of the market brought into existence two 
spheres, the Party-state and the market (lb). Media and their audiences are placed in 
the overlapping region of the two spheres. The reason is that all media outlets are still 
at least nominally considered Party organs and required to toe the Party line. At the 
same time, they also make their ends meet in market conditions. Similarly, audiences 
are now consumers and commodities in the market, they also continue to be addressed 
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by the Party as "masses," i.e., followers and subjects. The two diagrams in Figure 1 
clearly show that China's media institution has changed from a monist system to a 
bifurcated system. The meaning system represented by the concept of audience is 
congealed by this change. The practices that produce and reproduce the relationships 
in the bifurcated system have been institutionalizing, i.e., continuously reproducing 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This thesis is a case study of the ideational changes marked by supplementing 
"masses" in Maoist doctrine with "audience" in the reform discourse. Attempting to 
both understand the specific historical processes in China's media reforms and 
achieve theoretical generalizations beyond the Chinese case, I have deliberately 
included in my narrative of the Chinese case comparisons with the situations in the US. 
I have also attempted to discuss the change from “masses” to "audience" in general 
theoretical terms. Several conclusions may be drawn from this analysis on the process 
of ideational changes and their articulations with the changing historical conditions. 
First, ideas, when they become part of our "social reality," are coupled with specific 
social conditions. My analysis shows that “masses” and "audience" in different 
historical and political conditions in China reveal this feature. Upon establishing a 
stable coupling with institutionalized practices, an idea and the meaning system that it 
signifies becomes a “meaning-complex of actions" (Weber, 1947，p. 101), rendering 
significance to the related practices and legitimizes such practices. My analysis of the 
articulation of the "audience" concept with the reform practices clearly demonstrates 
the validity of this general theoretical claim. 
Second, when the changing social conditions have called into question of the 
coherence of an existing "meaning-complex," space for some new idea becomes 
available. Certain actors with access to alternative sources of information will be in 
the position to spot and introduce new ideas, as it was the case in the introduction of 
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the concept of audience and the practice of audience surveys. There is a selection 
process in the introduction of new ideas. This process requires the changing social 
conditions that generate imperatives for change. It also requires the availability of key 
actors who have access to necessary resources and institutional legitimacy to act. 
When both of these conditions are present, the new idea that would encounter least 
ideological resistance could breeze in. As my analysis shows, the concept of 
"audience" crept into the reform discourse precisely because it had been from outside 
of the ideological debate between "Party and people principles." It resonated with the 
intellectuals who had the privilege to be exposed to foreign discourse; when it inspired 
the first audience survey, it had the backing of key political actors who had the right 
kinds of signifiers of legitimacy—political position and establishment intellectual 
status—in the existing system. 
Third, a new idea may crack open some institutional space for new practices, new 
relationships, and even a new industry. The new idea may congeal into these 
emerging "social facts." When that happens, we can say that there is a paradigm 
change. This process is filled with intriguing twists and turns as well as various power 
plays. In essence, it involves changing power configurations of the existing system 
that can be best described, for the lack of a better word, co-optation. On the part of the 
proponents of the new idea and its prescribed practices, they need to dress themselves 
in the legitimate discourse and be willing to play the game within the existing system. 
As to the established authorities, they need to see the benefits of incorporating the new 
into the existing system. The analysis in this study also demonstrates this theoretical 
generalization with the dynamics of developing audience surveys and the Party-state 
incorporating such practices into its system as well as the routine practices of media 
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production. 
Putting these three conclusions together, we can say that this study depicts an overall 
picture in which the change from "masses" to "audience" in the discourse on media in 
China is closely related to changing media practices. The relationship between them 
is dialectical in nature. While practices stabilize and congeal their related ideas, they 
also inhibit the challenges to these ideas. Ideational change first occurs in the 
discursive sphere, compelled by the weakening logical force of the existing idea 
system, caused by the inadequacy of this system to account for, prescribe, and 
legitimize a cause of productive actions. The condition is reminiscent to paradigmatic 
crisis in the development of scientific knowledge as analyzed by Thomas Kuhn (1962). 
Such ideational change inspires and prescribes new practices. Only through the 
appropriation, incorporation, and institutionalization of these new practices can the 
ideational change be complete. 
In my analysis, I try to document and interpret the processes of ideational change in 
the specific context of China's reforms. While following the logic of socio-historical 
analysis in sociology of knowledge, my case study invites queries as to what extent it 
is specific to China. To a large extent, this may be the case. My study is predicated on 
the reality of China's reforms, which are initiated, directed, and implemented by the 
Party as an official program to change the Chinese society, albeit it unleashes 
initiatives and innovations from the non-official domains. The reforms thus are 
carried out with some explicit constraints, prominently among them are the 
maintenance of the Party's authoritarian control and insistence on incremental rather 
than drastic changes. Obviously, this not the case of the East-Central Europe, where 
111 
the dramatic changes of the political system completely discredit the Communist 
ideology. As a result, the market-based ideas do not encounter severe political 
resistance and they can be more conveniently adopted and acquire currency in the 
society. However, as some scholars (e.g., Splichal, 1994; Jakubowicz, 1992) have 
already observed, after the collapse of communism in those countries, the old Party 
press system has not been dismantled. The habit of old media practices dies hard and 
the conditions for realizing the western ideas of free journalism are found to be lacking 
(Jakubowicz, 1992). 
The changing practices discussed in this study are related to media management more 
than content production. This is partly because more changes have been taking place 
in media management and partly because the essence of the changes in recent years 
has been the introduction of the market into media operations. Market forces have 
been penetrating every aspect of media operation precisely through media 
management. The truth is, all these changes are accompanied by changing orientation 
in content production. As noted by several Chinese scholars, media content 
production has shifted from the Party-centered orientation to audience-centered 
orientation. The basis for designing and evaluating media content has shifted from the 
Party's policies to primarily audience needs and satisfactions. With this shift comes 
certainly the changing perspectives and criteria employed to "reflect" the reality. 
These changes may eventually constitute a change of "journalistic paradigm" (Chan 
and Lee，1991). 
There are also many nuances and twists and turns in the changing journalistic 
paradigms associated with the introduction and expansion of the concept of audience 
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in China's media reforms. This study only offers a historical contour with broad 
strokes. However, some of the nuances and twists are theoretically intriguing and 
worth mentioning here for future studies. 
The first observation is that, the implementation of audience surveys was dressed in 
the coat of "enhancing the tradition of the Party press.” There is no doubt that for 
some key advocates of audience surveys, this was a strategic cover. The fierce 
assaults on survey research and even concepts such as "media" and "communication" 
in the early 80s when they were first introduced also demonstrate both the political 
wisdom of the early advocators and the validity of this interpretation. Ideational 
change is first manifested in changing discourse. However, in translating a new idea 
into social practices, managing one's discourse well could help the actors to go 
through the ideological maze. Ideational change is changing discourse and it is also 
realized at least in part through discourse. It would be useful to know the extent to 
which the actors involved in the process had both the practical and discursive 
consciousness in carrying out their actions and what differences having or not having 
such consciousness would have in their choices. 
Another observation is that the adopted conception of "audience" is entirely from the 
US intellectual tradition. In the Chinese discourse on audience, there is no trace of the 
influence of the critical school which tends to condemn the commodification of 
audience. As a matter of fact, one of the participants in the early development of 
communication research in China declared that the US mainstream ideas of audience 
are "more useful" in addressing the urgent problems in China's reforms. The 
European critical school's ideas belong to the ivory tower which is too distant from the 
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Chinese scholars?: To a large extent, this tendency is directly related to the fact that 
Wilbur Schramm was at the right place at the right time. In a way, there is a bit of 
historical accident that it was Schramm who preached the basic ideas of mass 
communication to Chinese researchers directly. But then, it may not be entirely 
accidental. Both the fascination of Chinese with the United States, the arch enemy 
until Nixon's historical visit to China, and the pragmatism that hovered above Chinese 
policy makers, intellectuals, and professionals made it inevitable that "solving China's 
practical problems" became an important criterion in the selection of ideas in this 
particular case of ideational change. However, this is only my speculation. To assess 
such arguments, we need a systematic analysis of the roles of political culture in 
ideational changes. 
The third observation is related to audience surveys. Modem survey research in China 
started with the 1982 Beijing audience survey. Not long after that, survey research 
proliferated. In the mid-1980s, survey research began to be employed by state 
policy-making agencies. Policy research, opinion polling, and broadly defined social 
surveys were once on the way to flourish, only to be interrupted by the crackdown of 
1989. Today, almost all survey entities concentrated on market-related surveys. 
Although some would conduct policy and social surveys for their clients, they mostly 
approach such projects simply as business propositions. The Party-state authority 
maintains a strict control over survey research that goes beyond marketing topics, as 
indicated by a recent decree of the State Council requiring all surveys to be registered, 
certified, and censored by the State Statistics Bureau. Political control certainly 
affects the scope and direction of the development of survey research in general and 
35 Xu Yaokui, personal interview on August 3，1999. 
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audience research in particular. This rise and fall in the proliferation of survey 
research suggests that the meaning systems anchored in the concept of "audience" 
clearly contain seeds of ideological oppositions and resistance. Under what 
conditions an in what ways would ideational changes reveal characteristics of 
ideological oppositions and resistance? This question remains to be studied. 
The above analysis shows that there are some weak forms of resistance. The 
practitioners in the survey research industry recognize the general applicability of 
survey methodology well beyond audience and consumer surveys. Their preparation 
could be transformed readily into practices when the right conditions are present. 
Without addressing the question in terms of ideological opposition and resistance, this 
study offers no logical ground to stipulate the conditions that would define "when." 
The “when” here also indicates a major assumption about future political changes in 
China. This assumption is also relevant to our analysis of the changing media 
institutions in China. If, as the two diagrams in Figure 1 suggest, the present media 
system is bifurcated and there are obvious tensions between Party control and the push 
and pull by market forces, then, can we say that the Party-press system is withering? 
There is no doubt that the addition of market forces is eroding some of the key 
linkages and mechanisms in the Party-press system. The establishment of the 
meaning system under the concept of "audience" is clearly undermining the Maoist 
Party-press ideology. However, the market forces are contained within the overall 
framework of the Party-state. The ideational contents associated with "audience" 
must be dressed in Party ideology, as it is clearly indicated by the co-presence of 
"satisfying the audience" and "approaching the masses" in the reform discourse. The 
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balance of power between the two contending ideologies can be tilted by momentary 
swings of political atmosphere (Chan, 1995). The road toward dismantling the 





1 .Material: A Collection of the CCP ’s Documents on Journalistic Work (1921-
1956). Beijing: Xinhua Press, 1980. 
Source: Compiled by the Institute of Journalism, the Chinese Social Science 
Academy. 
2.Material: Official speeches on journalistic work (1982-1998). 
Source: The Section of Official Speeches, in Chinese Journalism 
Yearbook, 
3.Material: Policies and regulations on journalistic work (1995-1998). 
Source: The Section of Media Rules and Regulations, in Chinese Journalism 
Yearbook, 1995-1998. 
4.Author: Mao Zedong 
Position: Party Chairman (1949-1976). 
Material: Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Journalism Work. Beijing: Xinhua 
Press, 1983. 
1 • 
5 .Author: Hu Qiaomu 
Position: President of the CASS (1978-1982), Secretary of the CCP Central 
Committee Secretariat (1978-1980), and key member of the Central 
Advisory Committee since 1987. 
Material: Hu Qiaomu: Talks on Journalism and Publication. Beijing: People 
Press, 1999. 
6.Author: Hu Yaobang 
Position: Director of the CCP Propaganda Department (1978-1980), Party 
general secretary (1981-1987). 
Material: (1) On the Party's Journalism work. People ’s Daily, August 14’ 1985, 
pi. 
(2) On the thought political work. Journalism Yearbook, 1982. 
7. Author: Zhao Ziyang 
Position: Premier (1980-1987), Party general secretary and first 
vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (1987-1989). 
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Material: (1) Report On the Work of the Government on the First Session of the 
Sixth National People's Congress, June 6’ 1983. Beijing: People 
Press, 1983. 
(2) Report on the Work of the Government on the thirteenth Party 
Congress. Beijing: People Press, 1987. 
8. Author: Hu Jiwei 
Position: Former director of the People，s Daily. President of the China 
Journalism Institute since 1980. 
Material: (1) Down Falls of Communist Tycoons: From Hua Guofeng to Hu 
Yaobang. Hong Kong: Ming Jing Press, 1998. 
(2) Essays on Journalism Work Beijing: Workers Press. 
9.Author An Gang 
Position: Former director of the Journalism Institute of CASS and member of 
the Management committee of the People ’s Daily. 
Material: (1) Studying our readers, Journalism Front, August 1981. 
(2) We must have a serious attitude toward surveys of the media 
audience, Chinese Journalism Yearbook, 1983. 
10.Author: Jiang Zemin 
Position: Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party (1989-). 
Material: (1) Jiang Zemin's talk to the senior editors of the Liberation Army 
Daily, people 's Daily, January 2, 1996. 
(2) Report on the Work of the Government on the fourteenth Party 
Congress. Beijing: People Press, 1992. 
Interviews 
1 .Xu Yaokui Senior researcher in the Journalism Institute of CASS. He was a 
researcher in the Department of Foreign Journalism Studies of 
the Institute in the early 1980s, where he got more opportunity to 
be exposed to the communication studies. Beijing, August 5, 
1999. 
2.Ming Anxiang Senior researcher in the Journalism Institute of CASS. A junior 
researcher in the Institute in the early 1980s when he was first 
exposed to the communication studies. And one of the editors of 
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Introduction of Communication Studies, published in 1983 which 
was widely considered the first book introducing the field into 
China. Beijing, August 5, 1999. 
3.Sun Xupei Senior researcher in the Journalism Institute of CASS, and former 
director of the Institute before 1989. An active advocator of 
press freedom and press law. Beijing, August 6，1999. 
4.Gan Xifen Emeritus professor of the Department of Journalism, the People's 
University, and former director of the Public Opinion Survey 
Institute. Beijing, August 7, 1999. 
5.Guo Qingguang Associate Professor of the Department of Journalism, the 
People's University. One of the first generations to be exposed to 
the communication studies before he went to Japan to further 
study in this field. Beijing, July 8, 1999. 
6.Tong Bin Professor of the Department of Journalism, the People's 
university. He was one of the first generation of the graduate 
students in journalism studies in China and has a first-hand 
observation on the changes both in the academic field and the 
practice field of China's media reform. Beijing, August 7，1999. 
T.Zheng Chaoran Professor of the Department of Journalism, the People's 
University. Beijing, August 6, 1999. 
g.Liu Minghua Professor of the Department of Journalism, the People's 
University. Beijing, August 6, 1999. 
9.Zhan Jiang Associate Professor of the Department of Journalism, the Youth 
Institute of Political Science. He has special sensitivity and a 
body of knowledge about the internal struggle of the academic 
circle of journalism and communication studies. Beijing, August 
5, 1999. 
10.He Zhou Associate Professor of the Department of English, the City 
University of Hong Kong. He was a graduate student in the 
Journalism Institute of CASS in early 1980s when he was first 
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exposed to the communication studies. Hong Kong, August 12, 
1999. 
11 .Zhu Jianhua Associate Professor of the Department of English, the City 
University of Hong Kong, an earlier participant of audience 
surveys and opinion polls in Fudan University. He participated 
in one of the earlier audience surveys in the early 80s and was 
instrumental in introducing survey research methods to the 
academic community in China. Hong Kong, August 12, 1999. 
13. Victor Yuan Chief executive of Horizen, a well-known marketing research 
company founded in 1992. Hong Kong, October 28, 1999. 
Trade Journals 
1. Chinese Journalism Yearbook (zhongguo xinwen nianjian), 1982-1998. 
2, Chinese Broadcasting Yearbook (zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian), 1986 一 
1999 
3 • Journalism Front (xinwen zhanxian), 1978-2000 
4. Chinese Journalist (xinwen jizhe), 1987-2000 
5. Journalism and Communication Research (xinwenyu chuanboyanjiu), 1998-1999 
6. Modern Advertising (xiandai guanggao), 1999 
7. Marketing Research (shichang diaocha), 1999-2000 
8. Journalism (xinwen xue), 1986-1999 
120 
REFERENCES 
An, Gang (1981). Study our readers. Journalism Front,(8)，5-9 (Chinese). 
An, Gang (1986). We must have a serious attitude toward surveys of the media 
audience. In Brantly Womack (Ed.), Media and the Chinese Public: A Survey of the 
Beijing Media Audience (pp.54-59). New York: M. E. Sharpe. 
Allor, Martin (1988). Relocoating the site of the audience. In O. Boyd-Barrett and C. 
Newbold (eds.), Approaches to Media: A Reader(pp.543'553). London: Arnold 
Publications. 
Altheide, David L.& Snow, Robert P. (1991). Media World in the Postjournalism Era. 
New York: Aldine De Gruyter. 
Althusser, Louis (1971). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses. In Lenin and 
Philosophy, and Other Essays. London: New Left Books. 
Baudrukkard, Jean (1994). Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Berger, Peter L. & Luckmann，Thomas (1967). The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Penguin. 
Beville, Hugh (1988). Audience Ratings: Radio, Television, and Cable. Hillsdale, 
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Billings, Victoria (1986). Culture by the millions: Audience as innovator. In Sandra J. 
Ball-Rokeach and Muriel G. Cantor (Eds.), Media, Audience, and Social Structure (pp. 
200-213). Newbury Park: Sage. 
Biocca, Frank A. (1988). Opposing conceptions of the audience: The active and 
passive hemispheres of mass communication theory. In Communication Yearbook 11 
(pp. 51-80). 
Bogart, L. (1972). Silent Politics: Pollings and the Awareness of Public Opinion. 
New York: John Wiley. 
Cantor, Muriel G. (1994). The role of the audience in the production of culture: a 
personal research retrospective. In Ettema and Whitney (Eds.), Audiencemaking: 
How the Media Create the Audience (pp. 159-170). Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
Cantor, Muriel G.& Cantor，Joel M. (1986). Audience composition and television 
content: The mass audience revisited. In Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach and Muriel G. 
Cantor (eds.), Media, Audience, and Social Structure (pp.214-225). Newbury Park: 
121 
Sage. 
Cao, Peng (1999). The Development of the Press Group in China. Beijing: Xinhua 
Press (Chinese). 
Chan, Joseph Man (1993). Commercialization without independence: Trends and 
tensions of media development in China. In Joseph Cheng Yu-shek and Maurice 
Brosseau (Eds.), China Review 1993 (pp.25.1-25.21). Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press. 
Chan, Joseph Man (1995). Calling the tune without playing the piper: The reassertion 
of media control in China. In C. K, Lo, S. Pepper and K. Y. Tsui (Eds.), China Review 
1995 (pp.5.1-5.16). Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
Chan, Joseph Man & Lee, Chin-Chuan (1991). Mass Media and Political Transition: 
The Hong Kong Press in China ’s Orbit. New York: The Guilford Press. 
Cheek, Timothy (1989). Redefining propaganda: Debates on the role of journalism in 
post-Mao Mainland China. Issue & Studies, 25, 47-74. 
Chen, Chongshan (1989). Public opinion in China. In Chongshan Chen & Xiulin Mi 
(Eds.), Perspectives of Chinese Media Effect. Shenyang: Shengyang Press (Chinese). 
Chen, Chongshan (1991). Ten years of audience survey research. References for 
Journalism Research, 55, 1-17 (Chinese). 
Chen, Chongshan, Zhu, Jianhua & Wu，Wei (et.) (1998). The Chinese journalist. In 
David Weaver (Ed.), The Global Journalist: News people around the World. New 
Jersey: Hampton Press. 
Chen, Chongshan (2000). A review of the research in audience in mainland China and 
its characteristics. Paper presented on the International Conference of Chinese 
Audience across Time and Space, Hong Kong, April 1-2, 2000 (Chinese). 
Chen, Huailin (1998a). The Commercialization of broadcasting media under 
monopoly domination in Mainland China. In Zhou He and Huailin Chen (Eds.), The 
Chinese Media: A New Perspective (pp.240-256). Hong Kong: The Pacific Century 
Press Limited (Chinese). 
Chen, Huailin (1998b). Contradictory development of advertising market share 
between Party-press and mass press. In Z. He and H. Chen (Eds.), The Chinese Media: 
A New Perspective (pp. 294-319). Hong Kong: The Pacific Century Press Limited 
(Chinese). 
Chen, Huailin & Lee，Chin-Chuan (1998). Press finance and economic reform in 
China. In Joseph Cheng (Ed.), China Review 1998 (pp. 577-609). Hong Kong: The 
Chinese University Press. 
122 
Chen, Huailin (1999). Institutional changes of Chinese mass media in the Nineties. 
The Twenty-First Century Review, 53, 4-14 (Chinese). 
Chu, Godwin C. (1977). Radical Change through Communication in Mao's China. 
Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii. 
Cohen, Myron L. (1993). Cultural and political inventions in modem China: the case 
of the Chinese "peasant". Daedelus, 122 (2), 151-175. 
Converse, Jean M. (1987). Survey Research in the United States: Roots and 
Emergence 1890-1960. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Converse, Philip E. (1987). Changing conceptions of public opinion in the political 
progress. Public Opinion Quarterly, 51，pp 12-24. 
Davis, Deborah (Ed.) (2000). The Consumer Revolution in Urban China. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Debord, Guy (1995). The Society of the Spectacle. New York: Zone Books. 
Edelman, Murray (1988). Constructing the Political Spectacle. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Elliott, Philip (1982). Intellectuals, the "information society" and the disappearance 
of the public sphere. In O. Boyd-Barrett and C. Newbold (eds.)，Approaches to Media: 
A Reader (pp.260-262). London: Arnold Publications. 
Ettema, James S. & Whitney，D. Charles (1994). The money arrow: An introduction 
to audiencemaking. In J. S. Ettema and D. C. Whitney (Eds.), Audiencemaking: How 
the Media Create the Audience (pp. 1-18). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Foucault, Michel (1973). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences. New York: Vintage Books. 
Fogel，Joshua &ZaiTOw，Peter (Eds.)(1997). Imagining the People: Chinese 
Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship, 1890-1920. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 
Gan, Xifen (1994). Debates contribute to the development of the journalistic science. 
Journal of Communication, 44 (3), 38-43. 
Ginsberg, Benjamin (1986). The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State 
Power. New York: Basic Books. 
123 
Gitlin, Todd (1978). Media sociology: the dominant paradigm. In A. Gouldner (et al.) 
(Eds.), Theory and Society (pp.205-253). Amsterdam: Elseverier Scientific 
Publishing Company. 
Gitlin, Todd (1980). The Whole World Is Watching. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Hall, Stuart (1982). The rediscovery of "ideology": Return of the repressed in media 
studies. In M. Gurevitch, T. Bennett, J. Curran and J. Woolacott (Eds.), Culture, 
Society and the Media (pp. 56-90). New York: Methuen. 
Hamrin, Carol Lee (1986). Conclusion: New trends under Deng Xiaoping and his 
successors. In M. Goldman, T.Cheek and C. Hamrin (eds.), China ’s Intellectuals and 
the State: In Search of a New Relationship (pp.275-304). Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Hamrin, Carol Lee and Cheek, Timothy (Eds.) (1986). China's Establishment 
Intellectuals: In search of a New Relationship. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. 
Herbst, Susan (1993). Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling has Shaped American 
Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Hu, Jiwei (1986a). On Party principle and people principle of the Party-press. In 
Essays on Journalism Work (pp.85-94). Beijing: Workers Press (Chinese). 
Hu, Jiwei (1986b). To study the journalism of Socialist construction. Chinese 
Journalism Yearbook, 1986，22-23 (Chinese). 
Hu, Jiwei (1998). Down Falls of Communist Tynoons: From Hua Guofeng to Hu 
Yaobang. Hong Kong: Ming Jing Press (Chinese). 
Huang, Shenmin & Ding Junjie (Eds.) (1999). China Media Industry Perspective 
under the Internationalized Background. Beijing: Enterprise Management Press 
(Chinese). 
Jakubowicz, Karol (1992). From party propaganda to corporate speech? Polish 
journalism in search of a new identity. Journal of Communication, 42 (3), 64-73. 
Kroker, Arthur (1992). The Possessed Individual: Technology and the French 
Postmodern. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
124 
Kuhn, Thomas (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Lee, Chin-Chuan (1990). Mass media: Of China, about China. In Chin-Chuan Lee 
(Ed.), Voice of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism (pp.3-32). New York: 
The Guilford Press. 
Lee, Chin-Chuan (1994). Ambiguities and contradiction: Issues in China's changing 
political communication. Gazette, 53, 7-21. 
Li, Changsheng & Luo，Jianhua (1998). Newspaper as "advertising paper": In need of 
effective distribution—Some media's new idea for running a newspaper. Modem 
Media Management (pp.32-33). Beijing: The China's Journalist Press (Chinese). 
Li, Liangrong (1995). Reflection and projection of the 15-year journalism reforms. 
Journalistic University, 43, 3-8 (Chinese). 
Li, Mengyu (1998). Setting up service system towards media industrialization: Some 
reflections on media group. In Modern Media Management ("pp.TO-Tl). Beijing: The 
China's Journalist Press (Chinese). 
Liang, Heng (1992). On newspapers getting into market. Reporters, December, 10-
13 (Chinese). 
Liu, Alan (1971). Communications and National Integration in Communist China. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Liu, Yannan (2000). Audience Ratings. Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting Institute Press 
(Chinese). 
Livingstone, Sonia & Lunt，Peter (1994). Talk on Television: Audience Participation 
and Public Debate. London: Routledge. 
Lynch, Daniel C. (1999). After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and "Thought 
Work" in Reformed China. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Ma, Zhongzhi & Hu，Dawei (1998). New era for press management: Audience-
centered approach. Modern Media Management (pp. 40-41). Beijing: China's 
Journalist Press (Chinese). 
Manning, RK. (1996). Dramaturgy, politics and the axial media event. The 
Sociological Quarterly 3 7(2), 1996. 
Mao, Zedong (1983). Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Journalism Work. Beijing: 
Xinhua Press (Chinese). 
McQuail, Denis (1994). Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction. London: 
Sage Publications. 
125 
McQuail, Denis (1997). Audience Analysis. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Mills, Wright (1969). The Sociological Imagination. London: Oxford University. 
Ming, Anxiang (1998). Popularization of communication research and China's 
journalism reform. Journalism and Communication Research, 6, 8-10 (Chinese). 
Moores, Shaun (1993). Interpreting Audiences: The Ethnography of Media 
Consumption. London: Sage Publications. 
Murdock, Graham (1992). Citizens, consumers and public culture. In Kim Schroder 
& Michael Skovmand (Eds.), Media Cultures (pp. 17-41). London: Routledge. 
Pan, Zhongdang (1997a). Institutional reconfiguration in China's journalism reforms. 
Journalism and Communication Research, 3, 62-80 (Chinese). 
Pan, Zhongdang (1997b). Alternative symbolic resources and their patterns in 
Mainland China's journalism reforms. Mass Communication Research, 54, 113-139 
(Chinese). 
Pan, Zhongdang (forthcoming). Improvising reform activities: the changing reality of 
journalistic practices in China. In Chin-Chuan Lee (Ed.), Power, Money, and Media: 
Communication Patterns in Cultural China, Everstan, IL: Northwestern University 
Press. 
Pan, Zhongdang (2000). Media uses, secularization of culture, and civic orientation in 
urban China. Paper presented at the 50伍 Annual Conference of the International 
Communication Association, Acapulco, Mexico, June 1-5, 2000. 
Polumbaum, Judy (1990). The tribulations of China's journalists after a decade of 
reform. In Chin-Chuan Lee (Ed.), Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and 
Journalism (pp.33-68). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Polumbaum, Judy (1994). Striving for predictability: the bureaucratization of media 
management in China. In Chin-Chuan Lee (Ed.), China 's Media, Media，s China (pp. 
113-128). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Postman, Neil (1984). Amusing Us to Death. New York: Basic Books. 
Price, Vincent (1992). Public Opinion. Newbury Park: Sage Publications. 
Renckstorf, Karsten, McQuail, Denis & Jankowski，Nicholas (Eds.) (1996). Media 
Use as Social Action: A European Approach to Audience Studies. London: John 
Libbey. 
Robinson, Daniel (1997). The measure of Democracy: Polling, Market Research, and 
126 
Public Life, 1930-1945. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Rogers, Everett M. (1994). A History of Communication Study: A Biographical 
Approach. New York: The Free Press. 
Rogers, Everett M” Zhao, Xiaoyan, Pan, Zhongdang, Chen, Milton, and the Beijing 
Journalists Association. (1985). The Beijing audience study. Communication 
Research, 12 (2), 179-208. 
Rosen, Stanley (1989). Public opinion and reform in the People's Republic of China. 
Studies in Comparative Communism, XXII (2/3), 153-170. 
Rosengren, Karl, Wenner, Lawrence, & Palmgreen，Philip (Eds.) (1985). Media 
Gratifications Research: Current Perspective. Berverly Hills, Calif.: Sage 
Publications. 
Said, Edward W. (1978). Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. New York: 
Pantheon Books. 
Schoenhals, Michael (1992). Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five 
Studies. California: Regents of the University of California. 
Schramm, Wilbur (1954). The Process and Effects of Mass Communication. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Schumpeter, Joseph (1991). The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Richard 
Swedberg (Ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Schurmann, Franz (1968). Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Shannon, C. & Weaver，W. (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communication. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Shi, Jian & Qiao，Yanlin (Eds.) (1999). True Words of "Telling the Truth ”• Shanghai： 
Shanghai Culture Press. 
Shils, Edward (1975). Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Splichal, Slavko (1994). Media Beyond Socialism: Theory and Practice in East-
Central Europe. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Smythe, Dallas (1981). On the audience commodity and its work. In O. Boyd-Barrett 
and C. Newbold (eds.)，Approaches to Media: A Reader (pp.222-229). London: 
127 
Arnold. 
Song, Youquan (Ed.) (1998). Chinese Radio Audience Research. Beijing: China's 
Broadcasting Press (Chinese). 
Song, Kerning (1994). China's news media control system and the responsibilities of 
editor-in-chief of a newspaper. Reporters, 2, 7-10 (Chinese). 
Stavitsky, Alan G. (1998). Counting the house in public television: A history of 
ratings use, 1953-1980. Journal of Broadcasting <Sc Electronic Media, 1998 Fall, 
520-534. 
Sztompka, Piotr (1993). The Sociology of Social Change. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Tedlow, Richard (1997). The beginning of mass marketing in America: George 
Eastman and photography as a case study. Journal of Macromarketing, 17 (2), 67-81. 
Tong, Bin (1994). Subjects and Mouthpiece: An Examination of the Historical 
Trajectory of China，s Journalism. Henan: Henan People's Press (Chinese). 
Tuchman, Gaye (1978). Making News: A study in the Construction of Reality. New 
York: Free Press. 
Tunstall, Jeremy (1971). Journalists at Work: Specialist Correpondents, their 
Organizations, News Sources，and Competitor-colleagues. London: Constable. 
Turow, Joseph (1997). Breaking up America: Advertisers and the New Media World. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Weber, Max (1947). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & co., Ltd. 
Webster, James G. & Phalen，Patricia F. (1994). Victim, consumer, or commodity? 
Audience model in communication polity. In James S. Ettema and D. Charles 
Whitmey (Eds.), Audiencemaking: How the Media Create the Audience (pp. 19-37). 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Wei, Yongzheng (1999). Outline of Chinese Communication Law. Shanghai: 
Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press (Chinese). 
White, Lynn (1990). All the news: structure and politics in Shanghai's reform media. 
In Chi'n-Chuan Lee (Ed.), Voices of China: The Interplay Politics and Journalism (pp. 
88-110). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Whyte, Martin King (1974). Small Groups and Political Rituals in China. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Williams, Raymond (1976). Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. London: 
128 
Fontana. 
Wright-Isak, Christine & Prensky, David (1993). Early marketing research: science 
and application. Marketing Research, 1993 (Fall), 16-29. 
Wu, Guoguang (1997). Zhao Ziyang and Political Reform. Hong Kong: Pacific 
(Chinese). 
Wu, Xiaoli (1999). "Masses" as keyword: Chinese literature in 1920s and 1930s. 
Paper presented on the Conference of Local Media Production, December 1999， 
Beijing, China (Chinese). 
Wuthnow, Robert (1989). Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure 
in the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and European Socialism. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Xu, Yaokui (1998). The gains and losses of communication research in China. 
Journalism and Communication, 4, 2-8 (Chinese). 
Yang, Weiguang (1998). Preface. In Ming Luo, Yunfang Hu and Jianming Liu (Eds.), 
Reports on China's TV Audience. Beijing: Social Science Literature Press (Chinese). 
Yu, Jinglu (1990). The structure and function of Chinese television, 1979-1989. In 
Chin-Chuan Lee (Ed.), Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism 
(pp.69-87). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Yu, Guoming (1996a). The Historical Trajectory of Transformation: China，s Media 
Practices and Theories in Social Reforms. Beijing: Central Translation Press 
(Chinese). 
Yu, Guoming (1996). Prosperity and hardship: the development of Chinese public 
opinion surveys in the 1990s. Media Perspective (Chinese), 1996 (12) (Chinese). 
Yu, Guoming (1998). Survey report: professionalism and professional morals of 
Chinese journalists. Reporters, 1998 (3)，10-17 (Chinese). 
Yu, Ying-shih (1993). The radicalization of China in the Twentieth Century. 
Daedelus, 122 (2)，125-150. 
Yuan, Qingming (1997). The Existing Journalistic Views and Views Media since 
China's Reform. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Journalism and 
Communication, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Chinese). 
Zhang, Li (1983). Book review: A look at human communication. In Journalism 
Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (Ed.), Communication: 
An Introduction (pp.135-156). Beijing: People's Daily Press (Chinese). 
129 
Zhu, Jianhua (1988). Public opinion polling in China: A descriptive review. Gazette, 
Vol.41 (1988)，No 3，127-138. 
130 
. 二  1  H  、
； 
• f"  <  一 






















































 /  “
』 


















I•圓 llllllllll ssLjejqi-n >|HnD 
